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PREFACE 
This publication reports the existing law of Missouri related to water-use. 
The study upon which the report is based was limited to an investigation of the 
Missouri court decisions and general legislation affecting rights to use waters 
within the state. 
No attempt has been made to analyze legislation and interpretative court 
decisions concerned with state and local government agencies or special districts 
enpowered to control various aspects of water use within their jurisdiction. 
Neither are federal jurisdiction over watercourses, Interstate nor International 
matters discussed. The former area is a subject for separate study. The latter is 
covered comprehensively in Mann, Fred L. , et.al., Water-Use Law in Illinois, Uni-
versity of Illinois Station Bulletin 703, Urbana, Illinois (1964), pages 230-279. 
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FRED L. MANN, JAMES MCLARNEY, ROBERT D. ANGLE AND FRANK MILLER 
SOURCE OF THE LAW 
The use of water in Missouri is governed primarily by court decisions ap-
plying common law rules. The common law of England was adopted in a sta-
tute which provides as follows: 
The common law of England and all statutes and acts of Parliament made prior 
to the fourth year of the reign of James the First, of a general nature, which are not 
local ro that kingdom and not repugnant to or inconsistent with the Constitution of 
the United States, the constitution of this state, or the statute laws in force for the 
time being are the rule of action and decision in this state, but no act of the general 
assembly or law of this state shall be held to be invalid, or limited in its scope or ef-
fect by the courts of this state, for the reason that it is in derogation of, or in conflict 
with, the common law or with such statutes or acts of Parliament; but all acts of the 
general assembly, or laws, shall be liberally construed, so as to effectuate the true in-
tent and meaning thereof. 1 
Unlike several neighboring states, the General Assembly has not adopted 
a statement of its water use policy. 2 However, in the act creating the Water Re-
sources Board in 1961 it did charge the Board with the duty of developing a 
plan for a gradual long-range, comprehensive statewide program for the conser-
vation, development, management, and use of the water resources of the state.3 
Presently, however, the water law of Missouri must depend primarily on prior 
court decisions. The legislature nevertheless has provided regulation of certain 
specific aspects of water use which will be noted in later discussion. 
Any legislative or court action regarding water use is subject to the "due 
process of law" and other provisions of both the state and federal constirutions.4 
In addition to state action, municipalities, drainage districts, administrative agen-
cies and local govermenral units also regulate water use. 
TYPES OF WATER SOURCES 
Even though all water is part of the same continuous hydrological cycle, 
different legal principles have been applied to water sources. 5 The common law 
I. §1.010. RSMo 1959 
2. Iowa Code Annor., Ch. 455A.2; KRS Ch. 262 (1962); Kans. G. S. 1949, §82a. 
3. The W ater Resource Board was created by the Missouri Legislature in 1961. The act created a committee 
whose concern is the coordination of plans for a state-wide program relating to all the problems of con-
servation. development, management, and use of water resources in the state. RSMo 256.180-.260 (1963 
Supp.) 
4. MO. CONST. art I, §10. 
5. Illinois lf/ater Use Law. Research Report AERRIA-Deparcmcnt of Agricultural Economics, University of 
Illinois, College of Agriculture (1957). 
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classed it as either (1) riparian or stream water, (2) percolating ground water 
or (3) surface water. Special rules have been developed for artificial watercourses, 
lakes, floodwaters and drainage waters. Prior to a discussion of these principles, 
it is necessary to explain the distinctions and definitions which Missouri courts 
have applied in classifying water sources. 
Riparian Waters 
Riparian waters are those confined within the banks of a natural water-
course or lake to which use and access rights attach. These rights belong to all 
land in contact with a watercourse or lake, including an island. The character 
of the water is immaterial. The rights attach to ponds and lakes even though 
there is no current. 6 
The courts defined a watercourse at an early date and have continued to use 
this definition without substantial modification. In approving instructions to 
the jury in a suit against a railroad company for damages resulting from illegally 
collecting and discharging water on the plaintiffs land, the court said: \ 
A watercourse is a scream or brook having a definite channel for the conveyance 
of water. It may be made up, more or less, from surface water from rains and melting 
snow, but after it enters into a channel and commences to flow in its natural banks, 
it is no longer to be considered surface water, and it is not essential that the water,. 
should continue to flow in such stream constantly the whole year around; it is suffi-
cient if the water usually flows in such channel, though not continually. That is, to 
constitute a branch or scream there muse be something more than a mere surface 
draining, swelled by freshets and melting snow, and running occasionally in hollows 
and ravines, which are generally dry. The water must usually run in a definite bed or 
channel, though it need not Bow continually the year around.7 
Three years later, in Benson v. The Chicago and Alton Railroad Company,8 
the court approved the trial court's instruction that: 
It is not necessary, in order to constitute a watercourse for the purpose of this 
suit, that there should be water constantly in the bed or channel thereof, but it is suffi-
cient if the same have a permanent natural location and that water is accustomed to 
run therein during a part of the year and in certain seasons, and is made up from the 
running of surface water which finds its natural outlet through its channel.9 
Later in the opinion, in an express attempt to fix a definition for a water-
course, the court adopted the language of a Wisconsin case: 
The best legal definition of the term "watercourse" which I have found, is that 
given by Dixon, C.]., in Hoyt v. City of Hudson, 27 Six. 661 : "There must be a stream 
usually Bowing in a particular direction, though it need not flow continually. It must 
Bow in a definite channel, having a bed, sides or banks, and usually discharge itself 
6. 1 FARNHAM, WATERS AND WAT ER RIGHTS §63, at 282 (1904). 
7. Munkres v. Kansas City, St. Joseph and Council Bluffs Railway Company, 72 Mo. 514, 516 (1880). 
8. Benson v. Chicago and Alton Railway Company, 78 Mo. 504 (1883). 
9. !d. at 507. 
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into some other stream or body of water. It must be something more than a mere 
surface drainage over the entire face of a tract of land, occasioned by unusual freshets 
or other extraordinary causes. It does not include the water flowing in the hollows and 
ravines in land, which is the mere ·surface waters from rain or melting snow, and is 
discharged through them from a higher to a lower level, but which at other times 
are destitute of water. Such hollows or ravines are not in legal contemplation water-
courses."10 
In 1885, the St. Louis Court of Appeals, in holding that several sloughs 
which carried off flood water when a particular stream overflowed were not 
watercourses, adopted the definition quoted above from the Benson Case. 11 Con-
sistent with the above decision, this same court found in 1888 that a defendant 
railroad had not obstructed a watercourse when it built an embankment across 
a slough which ran ar right angles to the Whitewater River. The slough had 
well defined banks and was from four to six hundred feet long, but its only 
source was flood water from the river which ran through the slough onto the 
surrounding land. In reporting the decision, a Massachusettes definition of a 
watercourse was quoted as follows : "a stream of water usually flowing in a defi-
nite channel, having a bed or sides or banks, and usually discharging itself into 
some other stream or body of water."1 2 The court felt this to be literally the 
same definition as used in the Benson case. 
In Gray v. Schriber13 the court adopted a New York definition of a water-
course: "a living stream with defined banks and channel, not necessarily running 
all the time, but fed from other and more permanent sources than mere surface 
water."14 The court added that water flowing over plaintiff's land supplied by 
rain and melting snow although running through a natural depression, was 
nothing more than surface water. 
In Nickett v. St. Louis, Memphis and Southern Railt-oad Company, 15 the St. 
Louis Court approved the trial court's instruction that: 
a stream does not cease ro be a watercourse and become mere surface water because 
at certain points it spreads over a level traer of land and flows for a distance without 
defined banks before flowing again into a definite channel,1 6 
Despite the fact this this instruction was not attacked on appeal, the language 
seems to be broader than in the other cases cited. The overflow water from a 
stream had ordinarily flowed into a slough then into a "cypress brake of con-
siderable width but with well defined banks on either side,"1 7 then into another 
slough and back into the original stream. It also appeared that water flowed 
through these depressions, at least ar every ordinary rain. 
10. !d. at 514. 
11. Jones v. W abash , St. Louis and Pacific Railway Company, 18 Mo. App. 251, 256 (1885). 
12. St. Louis, Iron Moun tain and Southern Railway Company v. Schneider, 30 Mo. App. 620, 623 (1888). 
13. Gray v. Schriber, 58 Mo. App. 173 (1894). 
14. !d. at 177. 
15. Nickett v. St. Louis, Memphis and Southern Railway Company, 135 Mo. App. 661, 116 S.W. 477 (1908). 
16. Id. at 668. 
17. Id. at 664. 
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In another case,18 the St. Louis Court held that water from a sewer drain 
and rain water did not constitute a watercourse, and that the city was not liable 
for its obstruction. 
The Springfield Court of Appeals in holding that certain overflow remained 
stream water, quoted with approval from 27 R.C.L. 1964 as follows: 
It is immaterial that the boundaries of such a stream vary with the seasons, or 
that they do not consist of visable banks. It is only necessary that these be natural and 
accustomed limits to the channel. If, within these limits or boundaries, nature has 
devised an accustomed channel for the limited flow of the waters therein during the 
dry season, and an accustomed but extended channel for their flow when the volume 
is increased by annual flood waters, and all flow in one continuous stream between 
these boundaries, and are naturally confined, and when the waters lower the overflow 
recedes into the main channel, this constitutes one natural watercourse for all such 
waters, and the rights of a riparian owner thereto cannot be invaded or interfered 
with to his injury.19 
Tackett v. Linnenbrink20 involved the defendant's placing a woven wire fence 
across a ditch which ran from his land to the plaintiffs land. The purpose was 
to prevent the ditch from cutting a gully back into the defendant's field, but 
the effect was to cause the water to be diverted to other parts of lower land to 
the plaintiffs injury. After adopting the Benson case definition of a watercourse, 
the court said: 
We can take judicial note of the fact that in Missouri an extensive watershed 
will finally result in such an accumulation of surface water as to create a watercourse, 
and just where surface water ends and watercourse begins may be difficult of exact 
determination. 21 
Without holding whether this ditch was a watercourse or not, the court 
concluded that the owner of the land lying above had a right to protect his field 
from the disasters of having it cut and divided by the encroaching gully or draw. 
The immediate question raised is how permanent the source of flowing water 
must be to constitute a watercourse. A watercourse as heretofore defined seemed 
to suppose a supply more permanent than mere surface water. The criterion 
appears to be that the source of the water is material. Other important factors 
are the continuity of flow and whether there are well defined banks which nor-
mally confine the flow. 
A recent Supreme Court case recognized the Benson case definition of a 
watercourse as having been approved by many subsequent Missouri cases. 22 The 
issue before the court on appeal was whether a natural depression which had 
been deepened by Defendant's predecessors forty years earlier and had carried 
the overflow of a lake was a natural watercourse. In holding that a drain for a 
18. Walther v. City of Cape Girardeau, 166 Mo. App. 467, 149 S.W. 36 (1912). 
19. Schalk v. Inrer·River Drainage Dist. , 226 S.W. 277 (1921). 
20. Tackett v. Linnebrick, 112 S.W.2d 160 (K.C. Mo. App. 1938). 
21. ld. at 164. 
22. Happy v. Kenton, 362 Mo. 1156, 247 S.W.2d 698 (1952). 
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natural lake could not be obstructed without liability, the court stated that be-
cause there is liability for mishandling water usually only if it is a natural water-
course, there is a tendency to fix a definition of a watercourse and classify all 
water not strictly within this definition as some other kind of water. But, the 
court concluded that: 
in determining whether or not a given drain is a natural watercourse, we have con-
sidered the function of the drainway as it then existed, rather than making the determi-
nation depend wholly upon whether a given waterway fitted precisely some approved definition of a natural watercourse.23 
From the above discussion it appears that a watercourse must be something 
more than mere surface drainage over the entire face of the tract of land occa-
sioned by unusual freshets or other extraordinary causes. However, thus far, Mis-
souri Courts have refused to follow a strict definition of a watercourse. 
At least one author, after reviewing the above cases, has concluded: 
that the paramount considerations in distinguishing surface water from that flow-ing in a natural watercourse are source, continuity of flow, and the physical character-istics of the drainway, along with the general lay of the land.24 
Distinguished from Surface Water 
The term "surface waters" refers to that form or class of water derived from fall-ing rain or melting snow or which rises to the surface in springs and is diffused over the 
surface of the ground while it remains in that state or condition and has not entered 
a natural watercourse. 25 
The distinction between surface and watercourse water is often the critical . 
issue in a suit to determine liability for obstructing, polluting, using or wasting 
water. Different rules are applied to different classes. The general rule is that a 
watercourse may not be diverted so as to injure a neighbor's land, but a domi-
nant owner has a right to improve and prevent damage to his real estate by pro-
tecting it from surface water, and in so doing may turn the water from his land 
onto the land below him. This he may do without liability for damages result-
ing therefrom.2 6 
The first suit requiring such a distinction between surface and riparian water 
was brought in Munkres v. The Kansas City, St. J oseph and Council Bluffs Railroad Company. 27 The railroad company had diverted and discharged certain water out-
side its natural drain. The court noted that whether water in a particular drain-
way is mere surface water or in a watercourse is a fact to be found by the ju~ 
under proper instructions. The correct instructions of the lower court charged 
the jury that a watercourse: 
23. Id. at 701. 
24. Davis, The Law of Surface Water in Missouri, 24 MO. L. REV. 137 (1959). 
25. Keyton v. Missouri, Kansas and Texas Railway, 224·S.W.2d 616 (K.C. Mo. App. 1949) . 26. Tackett v. Linnebrink, supra note 20. 
27. Munkres v. Kansas City, St. J oseph and Council Bluffs Railway Company, supra nore 7. 
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is a stream or brook having a definite channel for the conveyance of water. It 
may be made up, more or less, from surface water from rains and melting snow, but 
after it enters into a channel and commences to flow in its natural banks, it is no 
longer to be considered surface water. It is not essential that the water shall continue 
to flow in such a stream constantly; it is sufficient if the water usually flows in such 
channel. If it afterwards ceases to remain in a channel, but spreads out over the sur-
face of lowlands, and runs in different directions in swags and flats without any definite 
channel it ceases to be a stream or watercourse. 2 8 
Under a similar fact situation,Z9 another defendant railroad company had 
diverted water into a natural watercourse, causing it to overflow on the plain-
tiffs land. The instructions charged that: 
it is sufficient if the [bed or channel} have a permanent natural location and that 
water is accustomed to run therein a part of the year and in certain seasons, and is 
made up from the running of surface water which finds its natural outlet through its 
channel. 30 
The court adopted a Wisconsin court's language to the effect that hollows or 
ravines which convey only surface waters are not watercourses. In the 1952 case 
of ·Happy v. Kenton 31 the Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed this Wisconsin 
definition. 
A depression constituting a natural drain for surface water usually is not a 
watercourse. In Gray v. Schriber/ 2 Gray built a dam across a depression three 
·"hundred feet long, five feet deep and twenty-five feet wide at the base which 
backed water naturally flowing down the depression, up onto Schriber's land. 
The court defined a watercourse as "a living stream with well defined banks and 
channel, not necessarily running all the time, but fed from other and more per-
manent sources than mere surface water." 33 Applying this test, the depression 
was merely a natural drainway for the surface water supplied by melting snow 
and rain. 
The watershed above the dam in the Gray case appears to have been rather 
small, probably consisting only of the plaintiffs land and certainly not enough 
to . create any extensive accumulation of surface water. Therefore, the Gray case 
would seem to be less than good authority for the proposition that the source 
or supply of water for a watercourse must be more nearly permanent than "mere 
surface water." 
A ravine with well defined banks and a constant source of spring water was 
held in Belveal v. A .B. C. Development Co. 34 to be a watercourse, even before the 
water flowed off the proprietor's land where the spring originated. However, in 
28. Jd. ar 516. 
29. Benson v. The Chicago and Alron Railway Company, supra nore 8. 
30. Id. at 507. 
31. Happy v. Kenton, supra note 22. 
32. Gray v. Schriber, supra note 13. 
33. Jd. at 177. 
34. Belveal v. A.B.C. Development Company, 279 S.W.2d 545 (K.C. Mo. App. 1955). 
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Haftrkanp v. City of Rock Hill 35 a depression which was the only natural drain-
ageway for a watershed of twenty acres was not even contended to be a water-
course. The distinguishing factor between these two cases apparently is that in 
the former the water flowed continuously whereas in the latter, water flowed 
intermittently. 
The necessity of distinguishing between a watercourse and a natural drain 
or depression conveying only surface water was last before the Supreme Court 
in 1952. 36 Defendant Kenton had obstructed a natural lake causing it to expand 
and overflow onto the plaintiff's land. The obstruction was a levee built along 
the north boundary of the defendant's land. The lake was "V" shaped and had 
no other source of water than drainage from the surface of the surrounding area. 
The drain that was obstructed appears to have been merely a slight depression 
or low place through which the lake's overflow found irs way to the Missouri 
River, a mile to the south. 
The plaintiff did not claim a prescriptive right. The only issue before the 
court was whether the drainway was a watercourse. The court first acknowledged 
that a watercourse is as defined by the Benson case, then stated that in past ap-
plications of this definition to determine whether a given drain is a natural 
watercourse: 
we have considered the function of the drain way as it then existed, rather than 
making the determination depend wholly upon whether a given waterway fitted pre-
cisely some approved definition of a natural watercourse.37 
The evidence also showed that approximately fifty years before, a ditch had been 
dug following this natural drain and this ditch, in conjunction with the drain, 
had all of the attributes of a natural watercourse. 
The actual holding of the case is a narrow one. On page 1162, the court 
states: 
In the view we take of the case, it is unnecessary for us to determine whether 
there was sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably find that this natural 
drainway or waterway which existed prior to the construction of the ditch then con-
stituted a natural watercourse. 38 
On page 1163 the court states, 
.. . we think a natural drainway improved by an artificial ditch, following the exact 
course of the natural drainway, under circumstances indicating that it was to be per-
manent, and which combination thereafter meets the requirements of a "natural water-
course."39 
At least one writer seems to think the obstructed water should have been 
classified as flood water. He commented: 
35. Haferkamp v. City of Rock Hill, 316 S.W.2d 620 (Mo. 1958) . 
36. Happy v. Kenton, supra note 22. 
37. ld. at 1161. 
38. Id. at 1162. 
39. Jd. at 1163. 
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The court gave little attention in its opinion to the defendant's contention that 
waters escaping the lake in flood periods were surface waters, subject to diversion 
without liability by plaintiff, so long as not done recklessly or negligently, although 
a number of Missouri cases deem such overflow surface waters.'0 
The evidence presented in the case clearly showed that water flowed out of the 
lake most of the time during "wet weather" and that the only source of supply 
for the lake was rainfall and melting snow from the surrounding area. Another 
author, writing an earlier issue of the Law Review, begins with a review of Happy 
v. Kenton, then reviews a line of Missouri cases dealing with surface water, and 
concludes with the statement: 
It therefore appears that there is some basis by way of statute, and rather more 
basis by way of dictum to support the view that should a proper case be presented, 
the Missouri court would designate the natural flow doctrine as the Missouri doctrine, 
and grant an injunction or nominal (sic) damages, preventing acquisition of a pre-
scriptive right to continue the obstruction or use. 41 
Perhaps this writer felt that the court was granting relief to the plaintiff as 
a right not to have surface water flowing from his land obstructed by a lower 
proprietor and not as a right to the prevention of the obstruction of a water-
course. 
Happy v. Kenton has been cited often in recent cases. J acobs v. Frangos42 in-
volved liability for diverting water from its natural course toward plaintiff's land 
thus causing flooding and erosion of plaintiffs property. The St. Louis Court 
of Appeals, in citing Happy v. Kenton tor the proposition that a watercourse may 
not be obstructed, quoted the following with approval, " . . . one may not ob-
struct or so divert the natural flow of a stream without liability for ensuing 
damages to others."43 
The Happy case cites 59 A.L.R.2d 422,44 as authority supporting the com-
mon law doctrine as to surface water. In the text of this annotation, the author 
concludes, 
While the common enemy doctrine has been much qualified in the later decision, 
and there may be some doubt whether any modern court would apply it in its full 
rigor, it appears to be, in a more or less modified form, the present basis of decision 
in a number of jurisdictions!5 
In the Happy case4 6 , the court admits Missouri is committed to the doctrine 
that surface water may be obstructed without liability for consequent injuries 
as long as it is not unreasonably or recklessly done. After examining cases to 
40. Hanna, Property- Rights of Riparian Owner in Missouri with Respect to Ob.rtruction of a Natural or Artificial 
Watercourse, 18 MO. L. REV. 67 (1953). 
41. Id at 74. 
42. J acobs v. Frangos, 329 S.W.2d 262 (St. L. Mo. App. 1959). 
43. Id at 264. 
44. See. Annot. 59 A.L.R.2d 422. 
45. Id at 425. 
46. Happy v. Kenton, supra note 22. 
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determine what constitutes a watercourse, the court concludes that, although 
the common law doctrine as· to surface water is "generally" adhered to and evi-
dence of the existence of a natural watercourse must be produced to prove liabil-
ity, the court has always considered the function of the drainway. 
The court in the Happy case favorably cites Farnham on Waters and Ameri-
can Jurisprudence. Farnham believes that at common law there is a right to have 
water follow the natural direction of the drainage and a natural drain can not 
be obstructed if it causes a pond to form on the adjoining owner's land.47 He 
refers to the Federal Supreme Court case of Walker v. New Mexico & S.P.R.C. 48 
(which he feels was incorrectly decided) where a railroad company was held 
harmless for obstructing depressions and causing the realtor's land to be flooded. 
Missouri cases were cited in support of the decision bur Farnham, evidently 
very critical of the Supreme Court decision, says "Missouri has shifted from one 
rule to the other and back, and has finally by statute made it lawful to hasten 
drainage along natural channels."49 Then, getting closer to our present prob-
lems, Farnham says: 
The question of the right to obstruct a natur~.l drainage channel has been need-
lessly complicated with further questions as to whether or not a watercourse existed. 
The rules with respect to watercourses form a distinct class by themselves, and were 
formulated to conserve the interests of the riparian owners. On the other hand, the 
question of drainage involves, not only the welfare of the individual landowner, but 
also that of the community in so far as its healthfulness and prosperity depend upon 
relieving land of stagnant water and improving irs productiveness ... [T]he great 
weight of authority favors the proposition that a lower proprietor cannot place any 
obstruction in an obvious drainage channel which has been formed by nature and car-
ries the water from a higher to a lower estate. 50 
The Missouri courts were not included in the "great majority" by Farnham51 
and probably would not be today. 
In explanation of the Court's language in the early part of the Happy case, 
Farnham continues: 
Some courts have reached the same result by holding that channels which now carry 
merely surface water were once living streams . .. That these drainage ditches cannot 
be obstructed is supported by the great weight of authority. [Citations, not including 
Missouri.] To reach their conclusions, some of the courts above named have attempted 
to show that the channels in which the water was running were watercourses, within 
the rule governing riparian rights; and the attempt to demonstrate the existence of a 
watercourse was made necessary by the disastrous effects which would attend the op-
posite holding.52 
Perhaps the Supreme Court was referring to this proposition when it said: 
47. 3 FARNHAM, WATER AND WATER RIGHTS, §889b, at 2588 (1904). 
48. Walker v. New Mexico and Southern Pacific Railway Company, 165 U.S. 593 (1897). 
49. FARNHAM, supra note 47, at 2591. 
50. FARNHAM, supra note 47, at 2599. 
51. FARNHAM, supra note 47, at 2591. 
52. FARNHAM, supra note 47, at 2599. 
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we have considered the function of the drainway as it existed, rather than making 
the determination depend wholly upon whether a given waterway fitted precisely some 
approved definition of natural watercourse. 
Then, as if to admit that this had not always been done the Court states: 
some of the specific applications of the "common law rule" in this state may 
have resulted from a conclusion that this rule prohibits making any distinction be-
tween the various types of natural drainways and their particular functions, but, on 
the contrary, makes it essential ro hold that unless a drainway or waterway is in fact a 
natural watercourse then one may obstruct the flow of surface water therein without 
liability for ensuing damages. 53 
As authority, the court again refers to Farnham on Waters and American Juris-
prudence. 
The language of the Court and the reference to Farnham's treatise indicate 
such a strong commitment to the "common enemy" rule that it will not find 
liability for obstructing surface water in a natural drainway. However, in a case 
where an inequitable result would ensue, the court would define these natural 
drainways as watercourses and find liability for damages resulting from obstruct-
ing them. 
The Happy case cites American jurisprudence54 in reference to an obstruction 
of the flow in a natural drainway. Similar to Farnham, it finds most jurisdictions 
hold that even under the common enemy doctrine a lower proprietor cannot 
obstruct surface water when it has found its way to and is running in a natural 
drainage channel or depression. 
The language in Happy v. Kenton and the reference to the treatises were 
not necessary to the holding of the case and must be considered as dicta, but 
these references indicate a trend to apply a broadened definition to a watercourse. 
Distinguished from Overflow Waters 
It is almost a universal rule that overflow from a stream is treated as sur-
face water when it leaves the main current never to return, and spreads out over 
the lower ground. 5 5 Most courts make the d'istinction that if the water of a 
stream ceases to remain in the channel and spreads out over the surface of low-
lands, running in different directions in swags and flats without any definite 
channel, it becomes surface water. However, if the stream is merely extended 
beyond its normal banks, and flows down over the adjacent lowlands in a broad-
er, but still definite stream, remaining contiguous with the main channel, most 
courts have held that the "overflow" still retains its character as part of the 
watercourse. 56 Missouri has failed to make this distinction and treats all over-
flow water as surface water. 57 In the Goll case the reasoning was as follows: 
53. Happy v. Kenton, .rupra note 22. 
54. 56 AM. JUR., WATERS, §75 at 562. 
55. Davis, supra note 24, at 143. 
56. Ibid. 
57. Goll v. Chicago and Alton Railway Company, 271 Mo. 655, 197 S.W. 244 (1917). 
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It is thus seen that, after our adoption of the common law, the new question 
arose both in England and in Missouri as to whether overflow water is surface water. 
The English courts answered it in the negative, while the courts of this state have, in 
four cases, taken the opposite position. We feel a degree of confidence in suggesting 
that as the rule of the English courts may be the best as applied to the streams and 
fields of that country, so the opposite rule as followed in this state is more in har-
mony with the needs of our situation. In the absence of a good reason for a change, 
law, like water, should be kept as near as possible within its old and well defined 
channels, and we shall hold fast to our rule that overflow water in Missouri is surface 
water. 58 
The first discovered case referring to flood water was McCormick v. Kansas 
City, St. joe and Council Bluffs Ry. Co. 59 The defendant's embankment and bridge 
caused overflow from a creek to flow into a depression not connected with the 
creek. The defendant cut a culvert through the fill to drain the water into the 
other half of the depression on the plaintiffs side. The court treated the over-
flow as surface water but held that such water could not be collected and then 
cast on a lower proprietor. It said: 
The same rule would apply to water flowing over the country, which had escaped 
from the banks or natural channel of a running stream by reason of a flood in the 
stream occasioned by heavy rains or the melting of snow upon the surrounding coun-
try. 60 
The overflow was separate and apart from the creek channel. 
The second Missouri case concerning overflow water was decided in 1879.61 
The defendant railroad built a dirt fill across a slough which carried overflow 
water from the Missouri River during floods. Defendant's dirt fill caused water 
to back up on plaintiffs land and destroy his vegetable crops. The Supreme 
Court held the railroad liable for the destruction of plaintiffs crops, but at the 
same time held that the water must be considered surface water even though 
the overflow water remained contiguous to the river. 
Again in 1884, in an action against the same defendant by a landowner in 
the Missouri River Bottom whose land was flooded because of a fill, the court 
held the defendant harmless for obstructing floodwater. The railroad had con-
structed a bridge across a creek sufficient to accommodate the normal flow but 
in times of a heavy rain the creek channel expanded beyond its normal banks 
causing the overflow to back up on land previously not flooded. At the point 
where the bridge crossed the creek the land was level on either side and when 
the creek overflowed, there was one solid expanse of water. The overflow was 
treated as surface water, the court saying: 
We assume that the waters in question, overflowing as they did the banks of the 
creek, in consequence of the insufficiency of the channel of the same to hold and carry 
58. Id. at 668. 
59. McCormick v. Kansas City, St. Joseph and Council Bluffs Railway Company, 57 Mo. 433 (1874). 
6o. Id. at 438. 
61. Shane v. Kansas City, St. Joseph and Council Bluffs Railway Company, 71 Mo. 237 (1879). 
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on through the bottom, are "surface waters" within the meaning of that term, as used 
and defined in the books and authorities on that subject.62 
Only the McCormick case was cited, even though the water in question 
had settled in a depression separate and apart from the main channel. Farnham 
had this to say about Missouri's treatment of flood water at this point: 
A few courts have attempted to lay down the rule that overflow water of a river 
is practically surface water, and must be treated as such . .. The attempt to classify 
flood water from a stream as surface water has led to needless confusion. The Missouri 
court, in attempting to do so involved itself in considerable difficulty. It held that 
flood water was surface water, and because it was such, it could not be dammed back 
in such a manner as to injure an adjoining owner (McCormick and Shane cases cited]. 
But the rule has been adopted in that state that surface water could be dammed back; 
so that the court, by failing to treat flood water as in a class by itself, and treating it 
as surface water, succeeded in overruling the cases which had established the rule with 
reference to surface water. But, when the question again came to its attention it re-
turned to its former ruling on the subject of surface water, and, by doing so, retreated 
from the rule that flood water could not be dammed back. [Abbatt case cited.]63 
In the next case to arise, the Kansas City Court of Appeals relied on the 
statement in the McCormick case that, 
The same rule would apply to waters flowing over the country which had escaped 
from the banks or natural channel of a running stream, by reason of a flood in the 
stream occasioned by heavy rains or the melting of snow upon the surrounding coun-
try. 64 
The court reasoned that since the sloughs did not fit the requirements of a 
watercourse set out in the Benson case they were not watercourses. Therefore, 
the water in the sloughs must be surface water. 
In Jones v. St. Louis, Iron Mountain and Southern Ry. 65 the court held the 
railroad not liable for substituting a trestle for a solid embankment that for four 
or six years had protected the plaintiff's bottom land from flood water. The 
water was not concentrated or diverted from its natural flowage but was merely 
allowed to flow where it had before the embankment was built. In this case it 
appears the water would naturally flow back to the river about 300 yards below 
the trestle but defendant had not provided an opening there. The waters were 
backed up and flowed out over Jones' bottom land. The court did not attempt 
to analyze the evidence to determine if the water would flow over the bottom in 
natural drainways and back into the river or whether it was separate and apart 
from the river and merely meandering back to the river at the lower point. In-
stead the court assumed it to be surface water after it passed through the trestle 
under the doctrine of the Abbott case. 
62. Abbott v. Kansas City, St. Joseph and Council Bluffs Railway Company, 83 Mo. 271, 280 (1884). 
63. FARNHAM, supra note 47, at 2560. 
64. Jones v. Wabash, St. Louis and Pacific Railway Company, supra note 11, at 257. 
65. Jones v. St. Louis, Iron Mountain and Southern Railway Company, 84 Mo. 151 (1884). 
66. St. Louis, Iron Mountain and Southern Railway Company v. Schneider, supra note 12. 
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In Edwards v. Missouri, Kansas, and Texas Ry. Co./7 a suit for negligently 
obstructing a stream, the Kansas City Court said it was well settled in Missouri 
that water overflowing the banks of a stream is surface water without q:ualifica-
tion. 
In 1917 the Missouri court found occasion to reflect on its policy of treat-
ing all flood water as surface water. The case was Goll v. Chicago and Alton Ry. 
Co. 68 The facts showed that the railroad had dammed up several drainage areas 
where flood waters entered small streams and finally found its way back to the 
Missouri River further downstream. As a result of the dams, the plaintiff's land 
north of the river was flooded. In giving its opinion the court realized that there 
was authority contrary to the Missouri policy of treating floodwater as surface 
water, but did not feel compelled to change the established precedent. 
In Inter-River Drainage v. Ham, 69 a proposed levee was to be built through 
the relator's land, leaving about thirty acres between the levee and the river. 
Plaintiff complained that' the levee would narrow the flood channel of the river 
and cause his land to be ,overflowed more often than at present. The court con-
ceded that "overflow water from a stream is surface water and that one pro-
prietor has the right to shut off such surface water from his land without being 
liable to another for the damage thus caused."70 However, it was held this rule 
did not apply to the drainage district because it was not an owner protecting its 
land. It is said, 
This appellant does not own any land, nor any right of way for its levee. It is 
seeking to condemn such right of way over the land of respondents. In order to do 
that, it must comply with our State Constitution, Section 21 of Article 2, which says : 
"private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compen-
sation."71 
It has been held that a slough which acts as a flood channel for a river and 
which connects with the river at both ends may not be obstructed. Schalk v. In-
ter-River Drainage District72 involved a levee built parallel to the Black River 
which obstructed a slough running at right angles to the river. When the river 
reached a certain stage, some of the water flowed through a series of sloughs and 
back into the river ten miles downstream. Whether the slough was a water 
course that could not be obstructed was a question for the jury. Goll v Ry. was 
distinguished in that the streams acting as capillary channels for the Missouri 
River did not connect with the river where the water entered into them. St. 
Louis, Iron Mountain and Southern Ry. v. Schneider73 was distinguished on the 
grounds that the water was not returned to the original channel but was dis-
67. Edwards v. Missouri, Kansas and Texas Railway Company, 97 Mo. App. 103, 71 S.W. 366 (K.C. Ct. App. 
1902). 
68. Goll v. Chicago and Alton Railway Company, supra note S7. 
69. Inter-River Drainage District v. Ham, 27S Mo. 384, 204 S.W. 723 (1918). 
70. Id. at 724. 
71. Jd. at 724. 
72. Schalk v. !mer-River Drainage District, 226 S.W. 277 (Spr. Mo. App. 1920). 
73. St. Louis, Iron Mountain and Southern Railway Company v. Schneider, supra note 12. 
RESEARCH BULLETIN 889 17 
persed and spread over the entire country. The Springfield Court, in the first 
apparent cognizance of the different treatment afforded floodwater by a Missouri 
court, quotes from R.C.L. 
Whether the water from the overflow of streams is to be considered as a part of 
the watercourse, or to be treated as surface water, is the subject of diverse opinions. 
The most satisfactory rule which has been evolved makes its character depend on the 
configuration of the country and the relative position of the water after it has gone 
beyond the usual channel. If the flood water becomes severed from the main current 
or leaves the same never to return, and spreads out over the lower grounds, it be-
comes surface water. But if it temporarily overflows, presently to return as by reces-
sion of the waters, it is to be regarded as still ~ part of the stream. It is immaterial that 
the boundaries of such a stream vary with the seasons or that they do not consist of 
visable banks. It is only necessary that there be natural and accustomed limits to the 
channel. If, within these limits or boundaries, nature has devised an accustomed chan-
nel for the limited flow of the waters therein during the dry season, and an accustomed 
but extended channel for their flow when the volume is increased by the annual flood-
waters, and all flow in one continuous stream between these boundaries, and are 
naturally confined, and when the waters lower the overflow recedes into the main 
channel, this constitutes one natural watercourse for all such waters and the rights of 
a riparian owner thereto cannot be invaded or interfered with to his injury.74 
By distinguishing the Goll and Schneider cases, the court was limiting the 
doctrine of the Schalk case to the proposition that floodwater flowing from the 
watercourse into a well defined flood channel and back into the watercourse will 
be treated as remaining part of the watercourse. 
No attempt was made in Wells v. Payne75 to distinguish between different 
classes of floodwater. There, a railroad had obstructed overflow water from its 
natural drainage and caused it to back up onto the plaintiff's property. The 
court indicated that all floodwater would be treated as surface water and held 
that it becomes surface water as soon as it leaves the banks of a creek. 
Sigler v. Inter-River Drainage District76 involved the defendant's levee which 
obstructed several depressions, causing the plaintiff's land which lay between 
the levee and the river, to be flooded. The plaintiff contended that a series of 
sloughs and depressions through which water flowed from the river back into 
the river ten or twelve miles down-stream were natural drains and watercourses. 
The court's analysis of the evidence proceeded on the assumption that unless 
the sloughs and depressions could be classified as a watercourse, the floodwater 
must necessarily be surface water and thus could be obstructed or otherwise 
treated as a common enemy. 
In Place v. Union Township77 the court appears ro have infringed on the defi-
nition of a watercourse in order to avert a harsh result otherwise necessary be-
74. Schalk v. Inter-River Drainage District, supra note 72, at 279. 
75. Wells v~ Payne, 235 S~W. 488 (K~C. Mo. App. 1921) 
76~ Sigler v. Inrer~River Drainage District, 311 Mo~ 175, 279 S~W. 50 (1925). 
77. Place v. Unionrownship, 66 S.W.2d 584 (Spr. Mo. App. 1933). 
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cause of its reluctance to distinguish different types of floodwater. Union Town-
ship in Dunklin County constructed a north-south highway two miles east of 
a levee protecting the east bank of the Saint Francis River. On each side of the 
road ditches were constructed to drain off water and protect the road. The 
ditches, however, connected several sloughs, separated by ridges that ran east 
and west between the levee and the highway, and allowed water to run from 
the northernmost slough into the one farthest south, causing it to overflow 
plaintiff's crops. The issue was whether or not the northernmost slough was a 
natural watercourse that could not be diverted. The court held that there was 
sufficient evidence for the jury to find that it was a watercourse. The court 
reasoned first that not all floodwater was surface water. 
In the latter case [Goll v. Ry.] it was further held, following other Missouri 
cases, that overflow or floodwaters of streams, are to be treated as surface water. That 
rule has been qualified at least to the extent of holding that a slough, which connects 
with a running stream only during high water and through which such overflow 
waters flow between well defined banks and return to the main stream, may be re-
garded as still a part of the stream, and therefore not necessarily surface water. 78 
The only source of water in the slough after the levee was built was surface 
water and overflow water from small streams coming from the hills. The court 
did not consider it necessary that the slough had, before the levee was built, 
connected with the Saint Francis River, but it was sufficient that 
it was the natural drain from the hill lands to the east ; that it had well-defined 
banks; ... its waters constituted one of the big drainage problems of that territory; 
that it originally emptied into Cypress Creek and eventually its waters entered Saint 
Francis River in Arkansas. 7 9 
It does not appear that either end was open directly to a natural watercourse, 
that it had well-defined banks at all places or that it had a source of water more 
permanent than mere surface water. The fact that there was a drainage problem 
involved and that the slough was a natural drainway for flood water qualified 
the holding that the slough was a watercourse and prompted the statement that 
it was "something more than a mere temporary conduit of surface water."8 0 
Liability was sought to be imposed in jones v. Chicago. Burlington and Quincy 
Ry. Co. 8 1 under a statute8 2 raising a duty on a railroad to, 
construct and maintain suitable openings across and through its right-of-way and 
roadbed so as to afford sufficient outlet to drain and carry off the water, including 
surface water, along such railroad, whenever the draining of such water has been ob-
structed or rendered necessary by construction of the railroad. 83 
In laying its tracks across the Fox River, the railroad built an embankment 
78. Id. at 586. 
79. !d. at 590. 
80. Id. at 590. 
81. Jones v. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railway Company, 343 Mo. 1104, 125 S.W.2d 5 (1939). 
82. §4765 RSMo 1929 [now §389.660 RSMo 1959]. 
83. Jones v. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railway Company, supra note 81. 
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across Fox slough, a natural and convenient outlet for high water which emptied 
into the Mississippi River. The embankment turned the main force of the cur-
rent from the east bank to the levee on the west side, which finally burst, per-
mitting the river to flood Jones' cropland. 
This case came to the Supreme Court on transfer from the St. Louis Court 
of Appeals. The St. Louis Court had denied the plaintiff relief on the ground 
that Fox slough was not a watercourse and that the statute did not prohibit ob-
structing this type of surface water. It was admired that prior to the embank-
ment being built: 
. . . when the Fox River would overflow and the Mississippi River was low the over-
flow waters from Fox River would go into Fox slough and thence through the open-
ing into the east side of the railroad right of way into the Mississippi River, and that 
when the Mississippi River was high and the Fox River was low the waters from the 
Mississippi would likewise come back into the area of the levee district through the 
opening.8 4 
However, the court applied the tests decreed by the Munkres and Scott cases, 
i.e., that the water "usually" flows in a definite bed or channel with well-defined 
banks and a more "permanent" source than mere surface water. And since "it 
was only overflow water which ever entered into the Fox slough" and overflow 
water is always surface water in Missouri , the Fox slough could not be classified 
as a watercourse.8 5 The Supreme Court reversed the St. Louis Court of Appeals 
and affirmed the circuit court's judgment for the plaintiff. The court based its 
decision on the statute but at the same time held that Fox slough was a water-
course even though its only source of water was overflow water, setting forth 
rhe proposition that a natural drain, or channel, serving as a channel for over-
flow water will be treated as a watercourse. 
In Tackett v. Linnenbrink,8 6 Linnenbrink stretched a woven wire fence across 
a ditch or gully at the point where his land adjoined the defendant's. The fence 
was effective to stop the ditch from cutting back into his field, bur it caused the 
water naturally running in the ditch to cut a new channel through Tackett's 
bottom land, some places 300 yards wide, and forming ponds that would nor 
drain. The question of whether the ditch should be considered a watercourse or 
not was put before a jury. The trial court also instructed the jury that "overflow 
or floodwaters of streams constituted surface waters within the rule governing 
the right of a landowner to resist and divert surface waters incidental to im-
provement of land." 8 7 This seems to be a rather broad generalization not com-
pletely accurate because all floodwaters are nor held to be surface water. Limited 
to these circumstances however, it probably prejudiced neither party, but why 
the court even gave such instructions is questionable. Damming up a stream 
and causing the water to seek a new level would not seem to create floodwater. 
84. Jones v. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railway Company, 100 S.W.2d 617 {St. L. Mo. App 1937). 
85. Id. at 627. 
86. Tacket v. Linnebrick, supra note 20. 
87. Id. at 162. 
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Early in the opinion, the Kansas City court speaks of the "flood waters of said 
watercourse."88 Later the court cites the Goll case which dealt with a railroad 
obstructing floodwater and on the same page the court says: 
Overflow water must come from a stream or regular watercourse and the issue as 
to "overflow" is generally as to backing; and as to the general gathering of surface 
water over the land, the question is generally as to flowing off. 89 
Thus, perhaps the term floodwater includes the diverted water of a natural water-
course, at least until it has established itself in another channel and is again a 
watercourse. 
In Vollrath v. Wabash Ry. ,"0 Musselfork Creek was paralleled on the south 
by an embankment. The embankment and levees constructed by the plaintiff 
protected plaintiff's farm from the frequent overflow of the creek. However, to 
prevent the overflow water from running over the embankment and washing the 
tracks out, the railroad cut an opening, thus allowing floodwater to pass through 
in a concentrated stream onto piainriff's land. The Federal District Court held 
that floodwater must be considered as surface water because: 
The language of the Missouri courts has been unqualified and unequivocal that 
waters overflowing the banks of natural water courses must be treated as surface water. 
So treating such water it must follow that they may not be impounded or collected 
by artificial means and cast in a concentrated volume on the landowner below without 
resulting liability. That the overflow waters of the Musselfork were collected and im-
pounded cannot be denied91 
The court did not mean that the railroad should protect the plaintiff's land 
from the floodwater or be liable for all injuries caused by the floodwaters. The 
railroad was only to be liable for those additional injuries suffered because the 
embankment was there: 
But it is inconsistent with any sense of fairness or logic to assume that a land 
owner must by the maintenance of an artificial embankment protect his neighbor be-
low from waters of any character which .otherwise would flow upon the lower pro-
prietor's estate . 
. . . Applied to the case at bar the result is that the defendant is liable for the damage 
to plaintiffs estate of surface water upon that estate caused by the artificial condition 
created by defendant, and is not liable for any damage to that estate caused by such 
overflow as would occur absent the embankment.92 
In Keyton v. Missouri-Kansas- Texas Ry., 93 the defendant company built an 
embankment across plaintiffs bottom land, leaving one large culvert and seven 
88. !d. at 162. 
89. !d. at 163. 
90. Vallra th v. W abash, 65 F. Supp. 766 (1946). 
91. !d. at 772. 
92. !d. at 772. 
93. Keyton v. Missouri, K ansas, and Texas Railway Company, supra note 25. 
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small openings to permit surface and overflow water to pass through. Plaintiff 
complained that the openings were not sufficient to draw water from his land 
above the embankment where the water came through the openings with great 
force. The water complained of came from rain, melting snow and overflow 
from two small creeks immediately to the west of plaintiffs land. On appeal 
plaintiff complained of the trial court's use of "general overflow" in the jury 
instruction. The instruction, which was held to be reversible error, was: 
The Court instructs the jury that if you believe from the evidence that the dam-
age to the Plaintiffs complained of herein resulted from a general overflow of Camp 
Branch Creek and Goose Creek and that the same would have done the same damage 
to the Plaintiffs without regard to the lateral ditches and culvert, then your verdict 
should be for the defendant. 94 
The Kansas City court found that the term "general overflow" was not 
defined by the lower court and its use was confusing and ambiguous to the jury 
and hypothesized facts not in evidence. The court said, " . .. the terms 'over-
flow water' and 'surface water' are . . . not entirely synonymous. The latter is 
composed of waters not in a defined channel, of whatever kind, while the former 
may constitute only a small part of the surface water."95 The court also reiterated 
the now familiar doctrine that, 
If overflow or flood waters become severed from the main current of a natural 
watercourse or leaves the same and spreads our over the lower ground (as it did in 
this case) it becomes and is a part of surface water.9 .; 
In a 1950 drainage case, it was held that a drainage district was not liable 
for building a higher levee which would cause land not previously flooded to 
become flooded. 97 The basic reasoning of the court was that the drainage dis-
trict is a governmental agency exercising its police power to protect its land-
owners within the district, even though the water be turned on the land of 
others outside the district. The doctrine of the case will be looked at more close-
ly later in the Drainage section, but it should be noted here that the court recog-
nizes that "overflow out of banks from rivers or other watercourses in times of 
flood is 'surface water,' as well as that produced by heavy rains or snows ... The 
common law doctrine is that surface water is a common enemy, and that each land 
owner may ward it off, though by doing so he turns it on his neighbors ."98 
Thus, the court does not seem to be distinguishing between the different kinds 
of surface water, nor does it seem to recognize that it has previously broadened 
the definition of a watercourse to include floodwater remaining continuously in 
the normal channel. However, until the courts expressly abrogate the doctrine 
that some overflow will be considered as remaining in the watercourse, the doc-
94. ld. at 621. 
95. Id. at 622. 
96. Id. at 622. 
97. City of Hardin v. Norborne Land Drainage Disc., 360 Mo. 1112, 232 S.W.2d 921 (1950). 
98. ld. at 1120. 
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trine should not be abrogated by inference. Even though the defendant drainage 
district constructed the levee pursuant to a statutory drainage act, it would ap-
pear that this had no effect on the import of the case. 
In Blackburn v. Baydon, 9 9 Cener Creek formed the north boundary line for 
both plaintiffs and defendant's farms, defendant's being on the up-stream side. 
The creek overflowed frequently on to defendant's land, washing away the top 
soil. To reduce the velocity of the flood waters and catch the silt being washed 
away, defendant erected an earthen dike parallel to the common boundary. The 
dike began 150 feet south of the creek and ran to both parties' south boundary. 
During a heavy rain the opening left at the north end was not sufficient to ac-
commodate the expanded creek so enough water backed up to flow around the 
south end and flood 15 to 20 acres of plaintiffs land. 
The Springfield court held the defendant liable for the damage caused to 
plaintiffs land and crops, not because the part of the floodwater remaining con-
tiguous to the stream had been diverted away from the natural channel, bur 
under the theory that surface water may not be collected and discharged in an 
increased volume and velocity at a different place than it would normally flow. 
The plaintiff did not allege specifically that the dike obstructed a watercourse, 
but he did cite Keener v. Sharp, 1 00 which dealt with the obstruction of a water-
course. The court said there was no question of obstructing a watercourse in 
this case. 
Distinguished from Water in A rti.ficial Watercourses 
The rights and interests in an artificial condition of water are different from 
those in natural streams. The reason is that the latter are natural interests, i.e., 
they are inherent in ownership of property adjoining the water. However, in-
terests in water in an artificial condition must originate in the same way that in-
terests in other property arise: by grant, contract or prescription. 
Brill v. Missouri, Kansas and Texas Ry. Co. 101 is a typical example of the 
issue as to whether a particular body of water will be treated as existing in an artifi-
cial or in a natural state. The railroad had constructed a ditch parallel to its right-of-
way and within 15 feet of a creek. Overflow from the stream gradually washed out 
the intervening strip of ground so most of the water flowed down the railroad 
ditch. The original channel became partially obstructed with silt and willows. 
Some years later, the railroad dammed up its ditch causing the creek water tO be 
diverted back into the partially obstructed creek which overflowed onto plaintiffs 
land. The court held, citing Farnham, that for the plaintiff to prevail, there must 
be a watercourse, but it need not be an "ancient" one. The court quoted from 
Farnham as follows : "The rule is not changed by the fact that the water was 
flowing in an artificial channel."102 No Missouri case decisions were cited, but 
99. Blackburn v. Gaydou, 241 Mo. App. 917, 245 S.W.2d 118 (195 1). 
100. Keener v. Sharp, 341 Mo. 1192, 111 S.W .2d 118 (1937). 
101. Brill v. Missouri, Kansas and Texas Railway Company, 161 Mo. App. 472, 144 S.W. 174 (1912). 
102. !d. at 175. 
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the court elicited from Michigan and Massachusetts opinions that, where a 
stream is diverted by common consent for a series of years, everyone whose 
property was liable to be affected by the diversion had a right to have the diver-
sion continue uninterrupted. In other words, the ditch had become a natural 
watercourse. 
It is not necessary that the changed condition be in existence for the pre-
scriptive period of ten years. In McGhay v. Woolston, 103 during an extraordinary 
rainfall, a small creek overflowed its old channel, broke through a levee and es-
tablished a new course. Several years later, the defendant rediverted the creek to 
its old course. The court implied that if the defendant had acted promptly he 
would have been allowed to redivert the stream, but that in the intervening two 
year period the new channel had become substituted for the old one and pos-
sessed all of the physical characteristics of a watercourse as defined in the Ben-
son case and should be considered as a natural stream. 
All water not flowing or contained in a natural watercourse is surface water 
in comtemplation of the laws governing use, diversion or obstruction. 104 
Those factors determining when an artificial condition results in a natural 
watercourse will be investigated later in a separate section on artificial water-
courses. When an artificial condition becomes a natural one, it may not later be 
removed. 105 Also, if a natural stream changes its course, a former riparian pro-
prietor may not continue to treat the old stream bed as a natural watercourse. 106 
Even where artificial watercourses look like and serve the same purpose as 
a natural watercourse, no duty arises for a railroad to convey surface water to 
these artificial drainages. Until these artificial conditions become "natural water-
courses," they may be dammed up, diverted or used as any other private property 
with no rights in anyone but the proprietor of the land or the person causing 
the artificial condition.107 As long ago as 1849 this doctrine was recognized by 
Baron Pollock when he wrote: 
... [T}he general proposition that under all circumstances the right to watercourses 
arising from enjoyment is the same whether they be natural or artificial cannot pos-
sibly be sustained. The right to artificial watercourses, as against the party creating 
them, surely must depend upon the character of the watercourse, whether it be of a 
permanent or temporary nature, and upon the circumstances under which it is created. 
The enjoyment for 20 years of a stream diverted rests upon a different footing from 
the enjoyment of a flow of water originating in the mode of occupation or alteration 
of a person's property, and presumably is of a temporary character, and liable to varia-
tion.108 
103. McGhay v. Woolston, 175 Mo. App. 327, 162 S.W. 292 (1914). 
104. Happy v. Kenton, supra note 22. 
105. Greisinger v. Klinhardt, 321 Mo. 186, 9 S.W.2d 978 (1928). 
106. Stough v. Steelville Electric Light and Power Company, 206 Mo. App. 85, 226 S.W. 295 (1920). 
107. Ranney v. St. Louis and San Francisco Railway Company, 137 Mo. App. 537, 119 S.W. 484 (1909). 
108. Wood v. Ward, 3 Exchr. 748, 154 Eng. Rep. 1047 (1849). 
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Distinguished from Subterranean Waters 
No one has the right to interfere unreasonably with the natural flow of a 
stream, and it makes no difference that the current or stream is subterranean, 
provided it has a well defined and known channel. But water which filtrates or 
percolates through the soil or interstices of the rock is considered to be public 
property and the proprietor has no absolute or natural right to it. Thus, it be-
comes important to determine whether underground water flows in a "water-
course" or is spread generally through the soil like surface water. 
Because there is usually considerable expense involved in using underground 
water, watercourses and surface water have been looked to for the principal 
source of supply. Consequently there has been little litigation of the rights in 
subterranean water. The applicable legal principles have developed more slowly 
than those applying to surface water. In fact, only one Missouri case was dis-
covered which indicates what the court might consider as underground water. 
In that case, the question was whether the defendant, Jenkins, could be 
enjoined from opening a water gate that would drain his lake for the sole pur-
pose of causing plaintiff, Springfield Waterworks Company's , spring to stop 
flowing. It was admitted that the water flowing underground from the stream 
below the dam to the spring was percolating ground water and not a subter-
ranean watercourse. Thus, the court was not called upon to define an under-
ground stream. 1 0 9 
Because the Missouri courts have not defined underground streams or per-
colating waters, a New York case is cited to give some idea of the law applica-
ble to subterranean waters. The rule as stated in this case is that: "all under-
ground waters are presumed to be percolating, and to remove this presumption 
the existence and course of a permanent channel must be shown." 11 0 
The interest attaching to underground water will be investigated in the 
later sections on underground water. Generally, however, most of the litigation 
has taken place in the western states where a more arid climate necessitates more 
intensive use of water for irrigation. The permeable structure of the western sub-
soils permits the storage of great quantities of water. 
DOCTRJNE OF RIPARIAN RIGHTS IN MISSOURI 
A stream or lake may furnish a supply of water easily obtainable by many 
users. Consequently, litigation and regulation arose early regarding this supply. 
The legal rights applicable to watercourses apply also to ponds and lakes. There-
fore, these sources are treated as watercourses. This litigation has produced the 
doctrine of riparian rights which, in general, provides that owners of lands ad-
jacent to a watercourse hold certain rights to use it. As to the history of develop-
ment of these rights one writer states : 
109. Springfield W aterworks Company v. Jenkins, 62 Mo. App. 74 (1895). 
110. Flanigan v. State, 183 N.Y.$. 934, 113 Misc. 91 (1920) . 
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With the progress of the industrial revolution of the 1800's and the consequent 
increase in the demand for water and the use of watercourses, a theory began to 
emerge that riparian owners ought to have equal and correlative rights in ordinary 
watercourses, a theory contrary to the then current English rule of prior appropria-
tions. In the United States, this theory was first manifested in the writings of Kent 
and Story about 1825. They imported the term "riparian" from the civil law, and pro-
posed in essence the civil law of riparian rights, drawing particularly from the Code 
Napoleon. And in 1833 the English Court developed from this idea a new rule of 
riparian law, again changing the English theory and abandoning the prior appropria-
tion rule. The rule established in England in 1833 has been called the "natural flow" 
rule, and has persisted in that country up until the present time. In brief, this theory 
provides that each riparian owner is entitled to the flow of the stream as it existed 
in a natural state, subject only to diminution by other riparians for "natural" uses 
(e.g., drinking purposes) . 
Water law in the United States also began taking shape in the 1800's. But in this 
country at least three distinct theories have grown up and are applied today, with 
some states applying variations between them. In most of the states, excluding the far 
west, the idea that all riparian owners ought to have correlative rights, provided the 
foundation for the law of waters, as was the case in England. But in applying the 
same general thought, the states developed at least two distinct theories. Some states 
adopted the English rule of natural flow. Other states produced a different rule, which 
has been called the "reasonable use" rule. This rule provides that every riparian is en-
titled to make a reasonable use of the stream on his land and has a right that other 
riparian owners will not make any use which would be unreasonable, as to him ... 111 
The term "riparian"112 properly is used to designate land contiguous to the 
banks of a watercourse, but the courts ordinarily use it to refer to a watercourse 
or a lake. 113 Riparian land is that contiguous to the bank of a body of water 
and in contact with its flow. 
The riparian doctrine provides that the owner of land that adjoins or is traversed 
by a natural watercourse (called a riparian owner) has certain rights to use its waters 
that accompany the ownership of such land. These are rights of use, not ownership, 
of the flowing waters. But they ordinarily are regarded as property rights and entitled 
to appropriate legal protection.u 4 
It is less than certain what rule of riparian rights would prevail in Missouri 
today if the question were litigated. At least one writer has concluded that the 
... reasonable use theory is most desirable today because it allows for the fullest 
possible beneficial use of the watercourses of the state, without the rigors of an ab-
solute rule such as prior appropriation. 115 
Before discussing some of the Missouri cases dealing with riparian rights, 
111. Burrell and Stubbs, The Rights of a Riparian Landowner in Missouri, 19 MO. L. REV. 138, 139 (1954). 
112. The Latin word. "ripa" means bank of a stream. 
113. Gould, Waters 148 (3rd ed. 1900). 
114. Ellis, Harold H., D1!1Jelopment and Elements of the Riparian Doctrine with Reftn!nce to the Eastern U. S. (1960). 
115. Burrell and Stubbs, supra note 111 , at 145. 
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it should be noted that the terms "natural flow," "normal flow" and "ordinary 
flow" are used as a matter of course in many opinions without an attempt by 
the writer to indicate a preference for one rule or the other.11 6 
In the first case dealing with water, the Missouri court adopted the doctrine 
of riparian rights. A lower proprietor had dammed a watercourse and flooded 
the plaintiffs mill. The court said, "It is a plain principle that the proprietor 
of land is entitled to the use of a watercourse which flows through it, and the 
law gives a remedy for the violation of the right." 117 The court felt that al-
though an obstruction to a private watercourse is made a public nuisance by 
statute, it does not alter the common law right to use the watercourse. Mcintosh 
v. Ramk!in118 involved a similar situation and the court held that because the 
mill owner's property joined a running stream, he was entitled to use the water 
for power to run the mill if he could do so without injury to other riparian 
owners and the common law provided a remedy for interference with this right. 
In Greisinger v. Klinhardt, 1 1 9 the defendant, who owned the land surround-
ing the lower one-half of Lake Killarney and the dam, attempted to drain the 
water away from the plaintiffs property on the upper part of the lake. In the 
course of the opinion, the court said, 
Riparian rights are not confined to navigable waters. The right to the flow of a 
natural non-navigable stream, in its natural way, applies to upper and lower owners 
of land across which the stream flows. 120 
Farnham1 2 1 is cited as authority that a proprietor has a right to have a stream 
remain in its natural place and to use it as long as he does not materially inter-
fere with other riparian's rights. This limits other riparians from diverting, con-
suming for other than natural uses, polluting, or otherwise interfering with the 
regular or natural flow of the current so as to injure a lower proprietor, or from 
backing up water on an upper proprietor. 
In Dardenne Realty Co v. Abeken, 1 22 the St. Louis court enjoined an upper 
proprietor who diverted all of a stream from his land to fill artificial lakes for 
duck hunting. The stream was necessary for the continued existence of plain-
tiff's two lakes. 
In Keener v. Sharp, 1 23 it was held that a bayou which constituted a water-
course could not be obstructed. The court said, " It is settled law in Missouri 
that a natural stream cannot be dammed up nor the waters from its beaten path 
or bed diverted to the damage of property without compensation therefor."1 2 4 
116. Teass, Water and Tf'ater Courses-Riparian Rights-Diversion of Storm or Flood Waters for Use on Nonriparian 
Lands, 18 VA. L. REV. 223 (1932) . 
117. Welton & Edwards v. Martin, 7 Mo. 307 (1839). 
118. Mcintosh v. Ranklin, 134 Mo. 340, 35 S.W. 995 (1896). 
119. Gresinger v. Klinhardt, supra note 105. 
120. Id. at 980. 
121. 2 FARNHAM, WATER AND WATER RIGHTS, §462, at 1565 (1904). 
122. Dardenne Realty Company v. Abeken, 232 Mo. App. 945, 106 S.W.2d 966 (1937). 
123. Keener v. Sharp, supra note 100. 
124. Id. at 1195. 
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To hold that the bayou could not be obstructed, it was necessary ro distinguish 
riparian from both surface and flood water. 
From these cases it can be seen that the Missouri courts from the beginning 
have followed some version of the doctrine of riparian rights. An alternative 
doctrine, adopted in many of the more arid western states, is that of prior ap-
propriation, i.e., the first user has priority over everyone else. 
Since it is not likely that Missouri will adopt such a doctrine it will not be 
discussed further. Within the doctrine of riparian rights, however, several dis-
tinct theories have developed. Some states follow the English rule of natural 
flow, i.e., each riparian owner has an absolute right to the stream flow substan-
tially undiminished (except for "natural" uses), and a cause of action arises im-
mediately upon the diminution of the stream regardless of the fact that it causes 
no damage to the other riparians. Other states have developed the reasonable 
use rule, i.e., every owner is entitled co a reasonable use of the water in a stream 
flowing through his land and has a right that others will not use the stream 
unreasonably.125 
The natural flow theory includes the concept that each riparian proprietor on a 
watercourse or lake has a right to have the body of water maintained in its natural 
state, not sensibly diminished in quantity or impaired in quality, subject, however, to 
the privilege of each riparian proprietor to use the water to supply his natural wants 
and to make such other uses in connection with riparian land not sensibly or material-
ly affecting the quality or quantity of the water. Thus all riparian proprietors have 
equal rights to have the water flow as it would flow in the course of nature, qualified 
only by the equal privileges in each to make limited uses of it. Under this doctrine, 
a cause of action arises when there is an unprivileged use, even though there is no 
interference with the use or harm done to the plaintiff. This doctrine is relatively 
definite and certain, but is not-utilitarian in that it prohibits many beneficial uses of 
water which cause no actual harm to anyone. 
The reasonable use doctrine involves the concept that each riparian proprietor is 
entitled to be free from an unreasonable interference with his use of the water, and 
that each proprietor is privileged to make beneficial use of the water for any purpose, 
provided only that such use does not unreasonably interfere with the beneficial uses 
of other riparian proprietors. This doctrine is entirely utilitarian and tends to promote 
the fullest beneficial use of water resources. A cause of action arises only when the 
use being made by the defendant unreasonably interferes with the use being made by 
the plainriff.126 
In no case have the Missouri courts directly stated that they are committed 
to either of the above theories and it is less than clear which they would adopt 
if faced with the issue. Looking again at the cases discussed above in Welton and 
Edwards v. Martin it was said "to divert or obstruct a watercourse is by the 
common law a private nuisance."127 In support of this proposition, one of Chan-
125. RESTATEMENT, TORTS §342 (1939). 
126. Hanna, supra note 40, at 67. 
127. Welton & Edwards v. Martin, sT<pra note 117. 
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cellor Kent's opinions was cited. Chancellor Kent and Justice Story are credited 
with introducing the natural flow doctrine into this country. This language and 
the supporting citation could be taken to indicate a preference for the natural 
flow doctrine. However, the facts of the case were such that the same decision 
would have been reached under either theory, because there was actual damage 
to plaintiff. Also there is no reason to believe that the author of the opinion 
was concerned with distinguishing between natural flow or reasonable use when 
he wrote the opinion. 
Likewise, Mcintosh v. Ranklin1 ~ 8 involved substantial damage to plaintiffs' 
mill by the dammed up water and the same result could have been reached with-
out saying that plaintiffs were "entitled to the uninterrupted flow of its waters 
in their natural channel and the use of its power for their mill, if available for 
that purpose without injury to others ... " 129 
The threatened act of draining Lake Killarney in Greisinger v. KJinhardt130 
also would have been an unreasonable use of the lake water so that the asser-
tion that "the right to the flow of a natural non-navigable stream, in its natural 
way applies to upper and lower owners of land across which the stream 
flows," 131 is merely a general bolstering argument. Again in Keener v. Sharp/ 32 
the court said, "It is settled law in Missouri that a natural stream cannot be 
dammed up nor the waters from its beaten path diverted to the damage of prop-
erty without compensation therefor."13 3 But where examined in context with 
the defendant's flooding of plaintiff's land by obstructing the outlet of a lake, 
it was an unreasonable obstruction of a watercourse. 
The contention has been made that the injunction granted in Dardenne 
Realty Co. v. Abeken, 134 which compelled the defendant to restore the stream, 
forbade him interferring with or diminishing the natural flow and diverting any 
water therefrom except for natural uses, was an embarrassment of the natural flow 
doctrine. It would seem however that the plaintiff's use of the stream to fill 
several artificial lakes for duck hunting was unreasonable compared to plaintiff's 
use of the water in its natural condition for his business. Of this case it has been 
said that: 
... an injunction so broad is not inconsistent with an application of the reason-
able use theory to the facts at hand, if the trial court found it altogether unreasonable 
for the defendant to use any of the water for his duck hunting lakes. As has been 
noted, the courts tend to use the term "natural flow" in dealing with any riparian 
right case, regardless of the theory being used. But regardless of the proper inrerpre-
128. Mcintosh v. Ranklin, supra note 118. 
129. Id. at 996. 
130. Greisinger v, Klinhardt, supra note 105. 
131. Id at 980. 
132. Kenner v. Sharp, supra note 100. 
133. Id. at 1195. 
134. Dardenne Realty Company v. Abeken, supra note 122. 
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cation of the trial court's injunction, it is most noteworthy that the appellate court's 
opinion did not deal with the question of the proper rule of law applicable, nor with 
the injunction as such ... It is a general rule of appellate practice to deal only with 
the grounds for reversal urged by the appellant, and inasmuch as these apparently did 
not include the breadth of the injunction nor the proper rule of laws to be applied 
the court did not deal with or pass on these problems.135 
It could be argued that the natural flow doctrine was a part of English com-
mon law in 1607, the year from which Missouri adopted the common law, and that 
Missouri is committed by statute to the natural flow theory. 130 However, as late 
as 1831, English cases were decided on the original doctrine of prior appropria-
tions.137 There the court said: 
By the law of England the person who first appropriates any part of the water 
flowing through his own land to his own use has the right to the use of so much as 
he appropriates against any other.138 
Samuel C. Wei!, a noted authority on water law, has written that England 
actually adopted the natural flow language from Justin Story and Chancellor 
Kent's writing, where it had been borrowed from the Civil law. 
Whatever the state of the English common law in 1607, it should be only 
persuasive authority today in jurisdictions that have not expressly adopted either 
theory. Several times the Missouri courts have said that the English common 
law in 1607 is not binding. Recently they reemphasized this position when an 
unfortunate counsel urged that the court should disregard the judicial, social, 
and economic climate of the present and that the court's sole function was to 
find the common law of England as it existed in 1607. The court said: 
Our Supreme Court has defined the common law as a "system of elementary rules 
and of general judicial declarations of principles, which are continually expanding 
with the progress of society, adapting themselves to the gradual changes of trade, 
commerce, arts, inventions, and the exigencies and usages of the country." [T}he 
common law is not a static but a dynamic and growing thing. Its rules arise from 
the application of reason to the changing conditions of society. It inheres in the life 
of society, not in the decisions interpreting that life." And, "Flexibility and capacity 
for growth and adaptation is the peculiar boast and excellent of the common law." 
Such is the letter and spirit of our Missouri cases as well as those in other jurisdic-
tions.139 
It has been suggested with considerable logic that because of the increasing 
trend toward the use of water for irrigation and diversion of water by terracing 
and other conservation practices, the absolute prohibition of the use of riparian 
135. Burrell and Stubbs, supra note 111, at 143. 
136. §1.010, RSMo 1959. 
137. Liggins v. Inge, 7 Bing. 682, 131 Eng. Rep. 263 (1831). 
138. Id. at 267. 
139. La Plant v. E. I. DuPont De Nemours and Company, 346 S.W.2d 231 (Spr. Mo. App. 1961). 
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water for other than "natural" uses is an undesirable doctrine. Ho One writer has 
described the doctrine of natural flow as follows: 
The so-called "natural flow" doctrine of riparian use is far more notorious in 
American water law for its bark than for its bite. For a good many years, the natural 
flow doctrine has been pointed to by legal writers as a shining example of an unjust 
and wasteful water use system. The natural flow doctrine has arisen from scattered 
statements which the courts have made to the effect that every riparian owner has a 
right to the natural flow of the stream, without diminution from any source. In the 
1848 Georgia decision of Hendrick v. Dook is found an excellent statement of the nat-
ural flow doctrine: 
"Each proprietor of the land on the banks of the creek has a natural and equal 
right ro use of the water which flows therein as it was wont to run, without diminu-
tion or alteration. Neither party has the right to use the water in the creek, to the 
prejudice of the other. The plaintiff cannot divert or diminish the quantity of water 
which would naturally flow in the stream, so as to prejudice the rights of the defend-
ants, without their consent; nor can the defendants, without the consent of the plain-
tiff, throw the water back upon him to his injury, for it is his right to have the water 
run in the channel of the stream as God made it to run." 
This, however, may be described as a relatively common form of judicial over-
statement; the issue before the court concerned the backing up of the waters of de-
fendant's mill pond onto plaintiff 's millsite. Therefore, the natural flow with which 
the court was here concerned was the flow of the water away from plaintiff's land, 
rather than to it. When there actually arose before the Georgia court the issue of a 
riparian owner's right to have the water flow down to him from the upper lands, the 
reasonable use test was applied. Many of the other judicial utterances of this nature 
seem ro fall within the same category as the Hendricks case: they are in the form of 
dictum, and the courts simply did not mean what they said. In a number of other 
decisions frequently cited to support the natural flow theory, the upper owner was 
diverting the water, which would be wrongful under any theory of riparian rights; 
the natural flow doctrine has either been read into the language of the court, or the 
court's natural flow statement was gratuitously included in the opinion.141 
In conclusion, apparently there is no precedent, judicial or statutory, com-
mitting the Missouri court to either the natural flow or reasonable use theory. 
However, the present economic and climatic conditions of the state would' dic-
tate the adoption of the reasonable use theory of riparian water rights in the ab-
sence of an expressed legislative policy. 
Where Riparian Water Can Be Used 
The Missouri courts have found no opportunity to define exactly to which 
lands riparian rights attach. Farnham states the general rule to be that land must 
be regarded as riparian when it is within the n atural watershed of the stream, 
140. Burrell and Srubbs, supra note 111, at 145. 
141. Lauer, Theodore E., The Riparian Right as Property, W ater Resources and the Law, Legislative Research 
Center, Michigan University Law School, 131, 194 (1958). 
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the title to which is in one owner, and the boundaries of which have been es-
tablished in accordance with the requirements of the conditions which will best 
serve the interests of individual land owners. Mere contact of a non-riparian 
tract with one that is riparian cannot extend riparian rights, although both tracts 
are owned by the same person, in cases where each tract was granted by a sep-
arate patent based upon a separate entry. That situation constitutes distinct tracts 
of land. 142 
Lauer has analyzed the doctrine of water use only on riparian land as fol-
lows: 
... [I)t is now generally held by both English and American courts that the 
water of a stream can only be used upon those tracts of land actually riparian to the 
stream. There are also a few decisions elaborating upon this concept and adding fur-
ther restrictions-for example, that riparian land is limited to the smallest tract in 
the chain of title which is actually adjacent to the watercourse, or that any part of a 
riparian tract which extends beyond the limits of the watershed will not be considered 
riparian. The reason for this additional restriction is not fully comprehensible; perhaps 
it is due to fear that without it the riparian doctrine does not limit strictly enough 
the use of water, or that if water is diverted for use to land distant from the water 
course, the surplus water may not be returned to the stream.143 
Who May Use Riparian Water 
Taking it as well settled that a riparian owner is privileged to make reason-
able use of the waters of a natural watercourse for any necessary and proper pur-
pose incident to the land itself and essential to its enjoyment which does not 
materially interfere with the rights of riparian owners, the question arises if this 
privilege may be conferred on another, i.e., a non-riparian, by contract, lease, 
grant or prescription. 
This question apparently has not been litigated in Missouri. As a general 
rule, however, water from a watercourse or lake may not be used on non-riparian 
land by a riparian owner, nor may he transfer his right to use the water to a 
non-riparian. 144 Of course, an agreement · between the riparian and non-riparian 
is enforceable between the parties, but most courts would allow any other ripar-
ian owner to enjoin the non-riparian's use of the stream. A minority of the 
courts would allow the non-riparian use unless there was actual damage to the 
riparian plaintiff But most courts hold that the reasonable use doctrine is not 
applicable to non-riparian uses. 145 
Usually, riparian rights belong to those who have the exclusive right to 
possession and use of riparian land, whether the interest is in the nature of a 
142. 2 FARNHAM, WATER AND WATER RIGHTS, §463a, at 1572 (1904). 
143. Lauer, supra note 141. 
144. Ziegler, Wilbert L., Water Use Under Common Law Doctrine, Water Resources and the Law, Michigan 
University Law School, Legislative Research Center, 51, 65 (1958). 
145. Crawford Company v. Hathaway, 67 Neb. 325,93 N.W. 781 (1903); Stratton v. Mt. Hermon Boys School, 
216 Mass. 83, 103 N.E. 87 (1913); Valparaiso Ciry Water Company v. Dickoner, 17 Ind. App. 233, 46 
N.E. 591 (1897); Harris v. Norfolk and Western Railway Company, 153 N.C. 542, 69 S.E. 623 (1910). 
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fee or a lease. 146 
Harold Ellis has summarized the non-riparian use of water as follows : 
Courts generally have held or said that the waters of a natural watercourse may 
not to be used on non-riparian land, as against a complaining riparian owner who has not 
consented thereto. But in a number of states such use is permissible on a. more or less 
temporary basis, until another riparian owner thereby suffers or may suffer some actual 
or imminent damage. 
Fpllowing this approach, courts usually have said that a municipality, even though 
it has acquired some riparian land, does not thereby obtain riparian rights to use water 
(other than on the riparian land it owns or has leased). But some courts have per-
mitted municipal use by treating the entire corporate limits of a municipality that is 
located on a watercourse as riparian to it. Incidentally, while much of the water used 
by a municipality may be returned to the watercourse, its quality may be impaired or 
its return delayed, or it may be returned far downstream from the intake point. 
A few courts have intimated that anyone who has obtained legal access to a 
stream (such as by leasing, or acquiring a right of way across, riparian land) might 
acquire sub.st:tntial rights to use the water on their non-riparian lands. For example, 
the Vermont Supreme Court has stated that the fact that certain persons "were taking 
water to their nonriparian lands did not per se make their use unreasonable. But the 
fact, together with the size and character of the stream, the quantity of water appro-
priated and all the circumstances and conditions, might make their use unreasonable." 
It would appear that in most states about all of the waters carried in a water-
course except for certain overflow water, as noted earlier are subject to riparian rights 
and hence the prohibitions or restrictions on nonriparian use. But impoundment and 
non-riparian use of more normal or imminent damage is caused to others in States 
where nonriparian use is permissible under such circumstances. 
Similar restrictions often apply to the use of water in place by nonriparians. Hence, 
such rights of use may be limited to riparian owners, their lessees, and their guests 
within limitations. But in a number of states, others may use the water so long as no 
damage to such persons would result. Certain water-use rights may be separated from 
the ownership of riparian land in some states by separate conveyance of such rights 
or of the bed of a watercourse. Some Michigan cases suggest that one riparian owner, 
as against other riparians, might permit non-riparians or members of the public to 
boat and fish in any part of an inland lake, at least so long as their rights of reason-
able use aren't impaired.147 
Prescription 
Riparian rights may be acquired by prescription if they have been used ad-
versely for the statute of limitations period of ten years. 148 The Missouri cases 
dealing with prescriptive use have all dealt with the diversion or obstruction of 
a watercourse, but a prescriptive right to any use may be obtained if the requi-
146. 56 AM. JUR., WATERS, §283, at 735. 
147. Ellis, Harold H., Development and Elements of the Riparian Doctrine with Reference to the Eastern U. S. (1960) . 
148. §516.010, RSMo 1959. 
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site elements are shown. The extent of the right thus acquired is generally 
limited to the extent of the use that had been made during the prescriptive pe-
riod.149 
In Bird v. Hannibal and St. joseph Railroad Company' 5° the St. Louis coun 
found that the defendant railroad had unlawfully obstructed a natural watercourse 
for more than ten years prior to the institution of the suit. The court held that 
the obstruction was permanent and since damage occurred almost immediately, 
such cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations of ten years which bars 
the plaintiff's right of entry since rights by prescription follow the statues of limita-
tions in respect to time.151 
In the same year, the Springfield court decided as follows in Smith v. Mus-
grove. ' 52 Before 1874 Honey Creek ran through plaintiff's land, but in that year 
it changed its course and ran through defendant's land. After ten years defendant 
dammed up the new channel and forced the water back into the old channel. 
When the diversion first occurred the defendant had refused to allow the new 
channel to be dammed up. In reliance on the new course of Honey Creek, the 
plaintiff removed a bridge across the old channel, built levees and houses and 
reclaimed two-thousand acres of marsh land; all on the faith of the supposed 
change in the channel of the creek. The court first found that plaintiff could 
maintain his action on the fact that the defendant acquiesced in the running of 
the stream in its new channel and the creation of new interests, and abandoned 
his easements to have it run in its old channel. However, the court preferred 
to base the decision on the theory of prescription. 
To the defendant's claim that the nonuser of an easement for the statutory 
period is only evidence of an intent to abandon his right to the old channel, 
the court answered that if the defendant did acquiesce, he lost his right by long 
acquiescence and if he hadn't acquiesced, it was against his will and adverse to 
his will and created the acquisition of an easement by prescription. The con-
tinuous, uninterrupted use by the plaintiff with the knowledge of the defendant 
was clear from the facts of the case. The only other element necessary for a pre-
scriptive right was held to be a claim of right by the plaintiff. The court found 
this existed from the fact that the plaintiff and other owners on the stream be-
low had made extensive improvements on the faith of the new condition of 
things. 
The doctrine in this case would require that the use be continuous, uninter-
rupted, known to the other party, adverse and under a claim of right for at least 
ten years. This doctrine has been affirmed as recently as 1962 in the case of 
Volkerding v. Brooks. 15 3 There the defendant claimed accretions to an island by 
149. Ellis, mp,-a note 147. 
ISO. Bird v. Hannibal and Sr. J oseph Railway Company, 30 Mo. App. 365 (1888). 
151. ld. at 379. 
152. Smith v. Musgrave, 32 Mo. App. 241 (1888). 
153. Volkerding v. Brooks, 359 S.W.2d 736 (Mo. 1962). 
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adverse possession. In refusing to accept the defendant's contention, the court 
said that the essential elements for title by adverse possession are hostile pos-
session, continuous possession, and notorious possession. 
The issue of claim of right of an adverse user was first adjudicated by the 
Supreme Court in Dunham v. joyce. 154 In that case the plaintiff contracted with 
the plaintiff's predecessor in title to construct and maintain a drainage ditch 
across defendant's land. The ditch was constructed and maintained by the plain-
tiff with the consent, knowledge and encouragement of the defendant, and 
served as a drain for both defendant and plaintiff. The evidence was insufficient 
to show a grant of an easement by contract and since there was 
no ... assertion of right to the ditch by the plaintiff or his grantors, open, ad-
verse, or hostile to the right of plaintiff or his grantors, in and to the ditch, on which 
a prescription of a presupposed former grant could be raised in favor of plaintiff or 
his grant or by ten years adverse use,1 55 
no prescriptive right to the continued existence of the ditch had occurred. The 
contract was a mere license, revocable at the will of the defendant. 
In analyzing situations of this nature it is necessary to distinguish between 
the grant of an easement by a written contract, proved by actual user, enjoyment 
of the acquisition, and a prescriptive right by open, adverse, exclusive, and un-
interrupted use for ten years.156 
For the sake of accuracy, a prescriptive right must be distinguished from 
the bar to a cause of action imposed by the statute of limitations. A "prescrip-
tion" is, strictly speaking, the term usually applied tO incorporal hereditaments, 
like "adverse possession" is applied to lands, and is a mode of acquiring such 
by long continued enjoyment. 157 However, a limitation or restriction as to the 
time in which an action or claim can be raised is sometimes referred to as a 
"negative easement."158 
At common law, the mode of acquiring title by what is called "prescrip-
tion"is founded on uninterrupted use and enjoyment. "Time out of mind, or 
for such a length of time that the memory of man runneth not to the contrary." 
The entry and holding in order to build up a title by prescription must be hos-
tile to the rights of the true owner. The true owner's rights must be invaded 
by such hostile acts as would constitute grounds for an action against the ad-
verse claimant or intruder, and so as to make the possession appear to be for 
the benefit of the claimant. 160 
The common law has been modified in this country to reduce the period of 
use to that necessary for acquisition of land title by adverse possession. Perhaps 
154. Dunham v. Joyce, 129 Mo. 5, 31 S.W. 337 (1895) . 
155. ld. at 13. 
156. §432.010, RSMo 1959. 
157. BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951). 
158. BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951). 
159. Marrin v. Burr, 171 S.W. 1044 (1914). 
160. ld at 1046. 
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this modification of the common law caused the failure of the St. Louis Court, 
in Powers v. St. Louis, Iron Mountain and Southern Railroad Company, 161 to dis-
tinguish between the two situations. The railroad constructed an embankment 
and canal on its right-of-way adjoining plaintiff's land in such a manner as to 
cause plaintiff's land to be overflowed. Without discussing whether the defend-
ant's act was done under a claim of right or adverse to the plaintiff's intesest, 
the court held that: 
As no suit was brought, nor any complaint made, within ten years after the right 
to sue for the injuries thus inflicted had accrued, it is demonstratable that both plain-
tiffs and their grantors acquiesced in the right of defendant to flood the land for the 
period necessary to bar an entry, thus creating a prescription which barred this suit 
when it was brought in 1894.162 
To acquire an easement in land by prescription the user must be under a 
claim of right so that the owner of the land will know of the claim and resist, 
if the claim is not well founded. In Vaughn v. Rupple, 163 the plaintiffs land had 
drained through a depression on the defendant's land below him. At the trial 
no evidence was produced to show that there was a "distinct and positive asser-
tion of a right hostile to the owner"164 of the lower land, and thus no prescrip-
tive right could be claimed to the continued drainage of the land. 
It has been held in the case of Ranney v. St. Louis and San Francisco Railroad 
Company/65 that a non-riparian landowner could not require a prescriptive right 
in a drainage ditch. There the plaintiff landowner contended that the railroad 
was under a statutory duty to construct lateral ditches along its right-of-way and 
connect them to private drainage ditches. The court assigned two grounds for 
the non-liability of the defendant. First, the plaintiff was not a riparian owner 
and could not acquire an easement in the ditches by prescription. The ditches 
were private structures, built by landowners for their own benefit and were closed 
by the defendant. The plaintiff had not previously used the ditches for drainage 
and was contending only that under the statute the defendant should have left 
them open and constructed lateral ditches to them to drain plaintiff's land. The 
second reason assigned was that even though prescriptive rights may be acquired 
in artificial watercourses, the watercourse must be of a permanent nature. A wa-
tercourse is temporary when it is intended to exist only so long as it suits the 
purposes of him who makes it through his lands. In such a case even a riparian 
proprietor cannot acquire prescriptive rights in the artificial watercourse. The 
court adopted the definition of the English Chancery Court of the word "tem-
porary": 
161. Powers v. St. Louis, Iron Mountain and Southern Railway Company, 71 Mo. App. 540 (1897). 
162. Id. at 544. 
163. Vaughn v. Rupple, 69 Mo. App. 583 (1897). 
164. Id. at 587. 
165. Ranney v. St. Louis and San Francisco Railway Company, supra note 107. 
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[T}he meaning of temporary is not confined to a purpose which happens to 
last in fact for a few years only, but includes one which in the reasonable contempla-
tion of the parties may come to an end, meaning, we suppose, it will end upon the 
occurrence of an event, the occurrence of which is obviously probable.166 
Such a temporary watercourse might be a drainage ditch or a ditch constructed 
to drain a mine. 
An oral agreement may be the basis of the acquisition of a right to the 
continued flow of an artificial watercourse if it is well defined, clearly proven and 
fully performed by the party asserting it.165 This doctrine is an exception to the 
statute of frauds and the courts require very explicit proof of the doctrine. In 
Daudt v. Steiert, 167 the plaintiff claimed an easement in the defendant's land for 
the continued flow of a ditch constructed pursuant to an agreement between the 
two that they would jointly construct and maintain the ditch for their mutual 
benefit. Mere proof of the construction and maintenance of the ditch was in-
sufficient to create the easement; an oral contract must be clearly proven, and 
full and adequate consideration shown. 
Preferences 
Farnham stares the general rule that has been accepted by every court that 
has spoken on the subject as follows: 
While the general rule is that of equality of right, the right of self-preservation has 
made an exception to the general rule in favor. of the right to consume water for what 
are known as domestic purposes. This gives the riparian owner the right to supply the 
needs of himself, his family, and his stock for drinking, cooking or bathing purposes, 
even though the supply is thereby consumed so that none is left for the owners lower 
down. Water being a necessity of life the firs t one gaining access to it may supply his 
needs, although the others are left to perish, the theory being that it is better ro pre-
serve one his life and strength than to leave all alike to perish by dividing the supply. 
And the use for this purpose takes precedence over all others, so that no other use 
can be made of the water if enough will not be left to supply the natural wants of 
the owners along the stream.168 
Missouri courts have found no opportunity either to adopt or disaffirm this rule, 
but there is reason to assume that they will follow most other jurisdictions and 
adopt it. 
A further question which is less settled is the right of a municipality to take 
water from a stream. In a 1926 suit by Cape Girardeau for discharging sewage 
into a creek, the court said 
as such riparian owners, [defendants] must endure without remedy such impuri-
ties and pollution as find their way into the stream from the natural wash and drain-
age of a city situated upon its banks and of the lands of other riparian owners within 
the upper watershed of said stream.' 69 
166. Id. at 488. 
167. Daudt v. Steiert, 205 S.W. 222 (1918) . 
168. 2 FARNHAM, WATERS AND W ATER RIGHTS, §467, at 1580 (1904). 
169. City of Cape Girardeau v. Hunze, 314 Mo. 438, 284 S.W. 471 (1926). 
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The court added that the city would be liable for additional pollution it caused. 
Two other Missouri cases have held a city liable for polluting a stream. These 
cases did not decide if the city was a riparian owner. 
The supreme court of Ohio has held in a suit by a lower mill owner against 
the City of Canton for consuming so much of a stream's water that his mill 
would no longer operate, that in a prior pollution case the city had been held 
liable for dumping sewage into the river and hence should be considered as a 
riparian owner entitled to supply water for its inhabitant's domestic needs with-
out liability170 However, to be valid it must be assumed that the municipality 
has "domestic and natural" needs for water.171 
Extent of Riparian Rights 
As stated previously the Missouri courts have neglected expressly to adopt 
the reasonable use theory of the doctrine of riparian rights. However, the courts 
have never uttered anything inconsistent with this theory and it is a reasonable 
assumption, in light of the almost unanimous adoption of the rule by other 
states similar to Missouri in climate and topography, that it will be adopted 
when the opportunity presents itself. Based on this assumption, it appears 
worthwhile to examine the fundamentals of this rule. 
The status of the doctrine of riparian righrs in Arkansas in 1955 was much 
the same as it is in Missouri today. In that year, the Arkansas Supreme Coun 
decided a case involving a riparian taking water from a lake for irrigation in 
such quantity as to endanger another riparian's fishing and boating enterprise. 
From an examination of its own decisions and other authorities the court an-
nounced the following general prinl"iples of the ripari-ari doctrine: 
(a) The right to use water for strictly domestic purposes-such as for household use 
-is superior to many other uses-such as for fishing, recreation and irrigation. 
(b) Other than the use mentioned above, all ocher uses of water are equal. Some of 
the lawful uses of water recognized by this state are: fishing, swimming, recreation 
and irrigation. 
(c) When one lawful use is destroyed by another lawful use the latter must yield, or 
it may be enjoined. 
(d) When one lawful use of water interferes with or detracts from another lawful use, 
then a question arises as to whether, under all the circumstances of that particular 
case, the interferring use shall be declared unreasonable and as such enjoined, or whe-
ther a reasonable and equitable adjusrment should be made having due regard to the 
reasonable rights of each. 1 72 
The principles enunciated by the court are almost universally agreed to by 
the authorities and would probably be adopted with little or no change by the 
Missouri courts in the absence of an intervening expression of a water use policy 
by the legislature. 1 7 3 Further, they define and limit what is a "reasonable use" 
170. City of Canton v. Schack, 66 Ohio 19 (1902). 
171. Lewis, Eminent Domain, 79 (2 ed. 1900). 
172. Harris v. Brooks, 225 Ark. 436, 283 S.W.2d 129 (1955). 
173. 56 AM. JUR., WATERS, §345, at 781. 
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as applied to a given set of facts. The court quoted from the Restatement of Torts 
as follows: 
The determination in a particular case of the unreasonableness of a particular use 
is not and should not be an unreasoned intuitive conclusion on the part of the court 
or jury. It is rather an evaluating of the conflicting interests of each of the contestants 
before the court in accordance with the standards of society, and a weighing of those, 
one against the other. The law accords equal protection to the interests of all the 
riparian proprierors in the use of water, and seeks to promote the greatest beneficial 
use by each with a minimum of harm to others. But when one riparian proprietor's 
use of the water harmfully invades another's interest in its use, there is an incom-
patibility of interest between the two parties to a greater or lesser extent, depending 
on the extent of the invasion, and there is immediately a question whether such a use 
is legally permissible. It is axiomatic in the law that individuals in society must put 
up with a reasonable amount of annoyance and inconvenience resulting from the 
otherwise lawful activities of their neighbors in the use of their land. Hence it is only 
when one riparian proprietor's use of the water is unreasonable that another who is 
harmed by it can complain, even though the harm is intentional. Substantial inten-
tional harm ro another cannot be justified as reasonable unless the legal merit or 
utility of the activity which produces it outweights rhe legal seriousness or gravity of 
the harm. 174 
The court, in the Arkansas case quoted above, concluded that it would be 
unreasonable to reduce the level of the lake below a certain point and enjoined 
the riparian farmer from irrigating beyond this point. 
In view of the increased use of water for irrigation and the substantial com-
mercial recreational enterprises dependant on streams and lakes in Missouri to-
day, it is less than improbable that a similar situation may face the highest court 
of Missouri. 175 In such event, the court could do worse than to adopt the rea-
soning of Harris v. Brooks. 176 
Natural Uses 
As stated above, any "natural use" is a reasonable use even if it depletes the 
entire source of water, leaving none for the lower riparians. Since "natural use" 
has not been defined by Missouri courts they are free to define it as they wish, 
but it probably would be limited to those uses absolutely necessary for existence, 
i.e., for drinking purposes, household purposes, water for a few livestock and 
would exclude irrigation on a commercial basis. 
A rti.ficial Uses 
Any uses that are not natural are classified by the courts as artificial. A basic 
premise of the riparian doctrine is that after the natural needs of all riparians on 
174. RESTATEMENT, TORTS, §852 (1939). 
175. Jones and Miller, Nature and Extent of Irrigation in Missouri, University of Missouri, College of Agricul· 
cure Research Bulletin No. 735. 
176. Harris v. Brooks, supra note 172. 
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a watercourse are satisfied, all other uses have an equal right to the remaining 
water. When the remaining water is insufficient to fulfill the demand, the rea-
sonable use doctrine dictates the proportional amount allocated to each use. 
From the subjective nature of the reasonable use doctrine, no predication of a 
priority scale is possible because the facts and circumstances of each case will 
determine the division for that case. This is assuming that the reasonableness 
test is applied in its virgin form, unaffected by statute, prior decisions, or other 
foreign influence. It has been suggested that the reasonable use theory is seldom 
applied in its pure form but that even though the courts "pay lip service to the 
standard of reasonable use, there seems to be a considerable divergence of opinion 
as ro how reasonableness is established in individual cases."177 
Because of the absence of a statement by the Missouri court of its view 
of the reasonable use theory, and the probability that it will be adopted when 
the opportunity presents itself, Lauer's interpretation of the possible application 
of the reasonable use theory is summarized below. 
Two different means of determining what constitutes a reasonable use have 
been applied. The first is "internal." Under it the courts examine all of the facts 
in the controversy and render a decision based upon what appears to be desir-
able under the circumstances. Each dispute is considered to be sui generis, and 
the decision rests entirely on the actual facts in the case, combined with the 
abstract ability of the judicial officer to determine what is a reasonable use. 
The second procedure could be called "external." It minimizes many of the 
factors that exist in the controversy and uses pre-existing rules to determine 
what constitutes a reasonable use. 
Most courts appear to resort to both the internal and external means in 
determining reasonable use. It appears that the external means is much more 
easily administered. Domestic uses are given a preferred position over all other 
uses. Pollution and use on non-riparian lands are per se unreasonable. 
External rules of reasonableness under the doctrine have fallen into several 
well-defined categories : (1) reasonable uses (irrigation, power and industrial 
uses), (2) reasonable uses which are to be accorded preference over other rea-
sonable uses (uses for household purposes and for watering some livestock), and 
(3) uses which are per se unreasonable (pollution, non-riparian, and municipal). 
Lauer summarizes his analysis as follows : 
... The rule against diversion, which is at least six hundred years old in Anglo-
American law, has its genesis in the right of all persons to the continued flow of a 
watercourse: "Aqua currie et debet currere ut currere solebar." By this rule, a right to 
diminish a watercourse could be gained only through twenty years diminution, and 
not otherwise. Since the primary purpose of water use in this early time, other than 
for domestic uses which consumed very little, was for power purposes, diversion to a 
hill located away from the natural channel was in fact the turning aside of a stream 
from its ordinary course. Once severed from the original course in any instances the 
177. Lauer, supra note 141. 
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water was not returned there, but allowed to flow into a wholly different watercourse. 
As the taking of this water disturbed the flow to other persons, it was held to be 
wrongful if they chose to maintain an action; otherwise at the end of twenty years 
a right to divert the water was gained by the diverter. There was no element of rea-
sonableness or reasonable use applied; a diversion constituted a diminution of the 
flow of the stream and was therefore wrongful. Although with the development of 
the reasonable use doctrine there was no longer a need to retain an explicit rule 
against diversion, since a diversion would almost invariably be declared unreasonable 
by the courts if it worked an injury to lower riparians, the rule has been retained in 
the law of water use, a vestage of an age long past . .. 178 
With this general development of the reasonable use theory in mind, some 
of the Missouri cases will be analyzed to determine the status of uses that have 
been litigated. 
Alteration of Quantity 
The basic rule is that every riparian owner is entitled to have the stream 
continue to flow through or along his lands in its accustomed channel and at its 
natural volume without any obstruction of the channel or detention of the 
waters by other owners causing injury. 179 The reasonable use theory appears not 
to be applicable to the obstruction of a watercourse under any circumstances as 
it has been declared that any "material interference" is a nuisance per se. 180 
In Welton and Edwards v. Martm. 1 81 the defendant, a lower proprietor, 
erected a dam below the plaintiff's mill which caused the water to back up and 
hinder the performance of the mill. In this suit to enjoin the maintenance of 
the dam, the court declared the common law to be that a riparian proprietor is 
entitled to the use of the watercourse and any diversion or obstruction of it is a 
private nuisance. The court further held that even though a statute made ob-
struction of a non-navigable watercourse a public nuisance, this statute was 
merely cumulative and did not affect the individual's common law remedy for 
such obstruction. The dam having been declared a nuisance, the relief to be 
granted was dependant on the law of nuisance. Thus, the court held, that since 
" ... there was no long possession ; no irreparable damage; no strong nor mis-
chievous case of pressing necessity, nor establishment of his right by a trial at 
law, .. . an injunction would not lie." 182 It appears, however, that had the plain-
tiff proven , in an action at law, sufficient injury the court would have later en-
joined the maintenance of the dam. The significant point seems to be that by 
holding the obstruction of a watercourse a private nuisance per se, the court is 
saying that any obstruction is an unreasonable use of the watercourse. 
178. Id. at 196. 
179. Happy v. Kenton, 362 Mo. 1156, 247 S.W.2d 698 (1952). 
180. South Side Realty Company v. St. Louis and San Francisco Railway Company, 154 Mo. App. 364 S.W 
1034 (1911). 
181. Weldon & Edwards v. Martin, supra note 117. 
182. Id. at 309. 
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In Brink v. Kansas City, St. joseph and Council Bluffs Rai!roads183 the de-
fendant railroad was held liable for building bridges across two creeks which 
obstructed the flow of water in times of high water and caused flooding of plain-
tiff's land. The court held no allegation of negligence was necessary and it was 
sufficient for recovery if it could be shown that the bridges caused the overflow. 
In McKee v. St. Louis, Keokuk and Northwestern Railroad' 84 the railroad closed 
up two culverts under its tracks and attempted to divert the watercourses by a 
ditch. The plaintiff, a tenant, rented adjoining lands after the obstruction and 
diversion were completed. The court held that the tenant's action for damages 
caused by flooding could be maintained. The railroad contended that any cause 
of action for the obstruction and diversion rested solely in the owner of the land 
and the tenant had no interest in the land when the culverts were filled. Had 
the injury inflicted been of a permanent nature and gone to the entire value of 
the estate, i.e., "where the owner of a servient estate, situated on a watercourse, 
has been deprived of the use of the water by a permanent obstruction or diver-
sion of a stream by a dominant proprieror,"185 only the owner of the land could 
have sued the railroad. However, the tenant had rented the land with a reason-
able expectation of raising a crop and had actually cultivated the land and hence 
had a cause of action. 
Mcintosh v. Ranklin186 involved a suit on a contract where the defendant 
promised to pay plaintiff a liquidated sum per day for backing up water into 
plaintiff's mill. It was held that the defendant's dam caused an unlawful inter-
ference with the plaintiff's property and the contract was valid and enforceable. 
No mention was made of the purpose of the lower dam, only that is was un-
lawful as to the plaintiff because he was entitled to the uninterrupted flow of 
the stream in its natural channel for power purposes. 
Scheurick v. Southwest Missouri Light Compan/ 8 7 was an action brought under 
a statute providing that a person who builds or heightens a dam or other ob-
struction across a watercourse without proceeding according to the statutes reg-
ulating the construction of dams, shall forfeit double damages to anyone injured 
by the obstruction. The dam was originally built in 1887, without statutory 
authority, as a wooden dam not extending completely across the stream. In 1890 
a power company replaced the wooden dam with a concrete one extending com-
pletely across the stream, also without statutory authority. The defendant ac-
quired the fee in the dam sometime after 1891, and in 1896 it increased the 
height of the dam 6 inches. The plaintiff contended that the dam obstructed 
Shoal Creek, causing it to back up onto his lands, obstructed a road, destroyed 
minerals under his land, and caused stagnant water to form which polluted the 
183. Brink v. Kansas City, St. Joseph and Council Bluffs Railway Company, 17 Mo·. App. 177 (1885). 
184. McKee v. The St. Louis, Keokuk and North Western Railway Company, 49 Mo. App. 174 (1892) . 
185. Id. at 179. 
186. Mcintosh v. Ranklin, supra note 118. 
187. Scheurick v. Southwest Missouri Light Company, 109 Mo. App. 406, 84 S.W. 1003 (1904). 
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air. Lakes were held to be a good defense for the obstruction caused by the dam 
which had been in existence for about five years, the court noting that defendant 
had purchased the dam in good faith and plaintiff had made no effort to recover 
his damages before. The lower court granted plaintiff $300 damages for the ad-
ditional six inches added to the dam but denied an injunction against the future 
maintenance of the dam. 
The statute referred to in this case provides that such a dam built without 
statutory authority may be enjoined as a public nuisance, but the defendant was 
asking for an injunction against the maintenance of a private nuisance. The 
Kansas City Court held that the dam could be enjoined as private nuisance if 
the plaintiff could prove a special injury and o~her necessary elements. In re-
versing the lower court and ordering the defendant to lower the dam by six 
inches the court said: 
Whatever mischief was done by enlarging the dam would constanrly recur-of 
that there can be no doubt; and, with the case in this posture, we know of no prin-
ciple on which the plaintiff can be denied an abatement of the nuisance. In Paddock 
v. Somes it was said that if the right was established at law, and the nuisance was of 
a continuous character, an injunction would follow, as a matter of course, regardless 
of the smallness of the damage suffered. Probably the court did not intend to state a 
rule so universally applicable. But generally speaking, when a plaintiff has obtained 
damages for a nuisance and the nuisance is continuous and recurrent, he is entitled to 
its abatement; and there is no reason why this case should be made an exception. If 
the defendant's plant would be destroyed or largely diminished in value, a court of 
equity might, and probably would, hesitate to grant an injunction. It is not necessary 
to decide what weight such a fact would have in this case, after an invasion of sub-
stantial rights of the plaintiff has been shown, and irreparable injury ... A careful 
study of the testimony has satisfied us that the business of the defendant and the op-
eration of its plant will not be interfered with by reducing the plant portion of the 
dam to its previous height; that is, six inches lower than it is now. No great expense 
will be entailed thereby, or the defendant's property depreciated.188 
In Beauchamp v. Taylor, 189 the defendant built a levee between his and plain-
tiff's land which backed water from a spring upon plaintiff's ~and. Defendant 
contended that the levee was in existence when plaintiff bought the land and 
hence bought it subject to the burden of the levee. The court held that if it ob-
structed a natural watercourse it was a nuisance and plaintiff, even though he 
could not recover for the erection of the nuisance, was entitled to damages for 
the maintenance of the dam. 
In South Side Realty Company v. St. Louis and San Francisco Railroads1 90 the 
railroad built a bridge across Cape La Croix Creek pursuant to a statute authoriz-
ing such but also providing that the railroad should restore the stream to its 
188. Id at 430. 
189. Beauchamp v. Taylor, 132 Mo. App. 92, 111 S.W. 609 (1908). 
190. South Side Realty Company v. St. Louis and San Francisco Railway Company, supra note 180. 
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former state or to such state as not unnecessarily to have impaired its usefulness. 
In building a bridge across this watercourse the railroad is bound to 
... leave such waterways or openings as are sufficient to afford an outlet for all water 
that may reasonably be expected to flow through such watercourse, taking into con-
sideration such freshets as might reasonably be expected to occur in view of the size 
of the stream, width of its bottom, height of its banks, carrying capacity, and the 
character of the country contributing to its flow. 
The plaintiff's complaint was that the framework of the bridge hung down 
several feet below the tops of the banks and caused debris to pile up and dam 
the water when a heavy rain came. The evidence tended to prove that the frame-
work could have been removed at little or no expense to the railroad and with-
out materially weakening the bridge. The plaintiff was awarded damages occa-
sioned by the obstruction. The defendant's obstruction would appear to be 
clearly unreasonable as to the plaintiff and it was unnecessary for the court to 
rely, as it did, on the ancient Maxim, sic utere tuo at alienum non laedas. 191 
In Meyers v. Beuchampw" the parties were opposite riparian proprietors. To 
promote h1s resort and bathing enterprise, the plaintiff obstructed an old channel 
of the Meramec River and developed a sandbar on his side. The plaintiff's acts 
caused the current of the river to be deflected against the defendant's banks in 
times of high water. To protect his bank from the deflected current the defend-
ant felled trees in the river and put an old boiler and a truck in the water, all 
next to his bank. The defendant's acts caused the current to be deflected back 
against the plaintiff's sand bar. The plaintiff sought an injunction for removal 
of these objects. The court affirmed the lower court's denial of the injunction 
because the evidence was so conflicting they could not make an independent 
finding, but as if to announce a doctrine that would control, it said: 
Of course, the defendant has the right to protect his land against the waters of 
the river so long as he does not change the current of the scream, or deflect its waters, 
in ordinary stages of the stream, and in times of ordinary freshets, so as to injure the 
banks of a lower or opposite proprietor. This is hornbook law. 193 
In Jacobs v. Frangos 194 the parties are adjoining riparian proprietors, the de-
fendant being the upper proprietor. The defendant had a bulldozer remove some 
gravel and willows on the north side of the stream. As a result, the channel 
changed from the south to the north side. The plaintiffs sued for diversion of 
the stream claiming loss of soil from erosion caused by the new channel, and 
that because the channel was changed their land was now only three feet above 
the bed instead of seven feet as it was before the change. 
The St. Louis court refused the defendant's contention that there was no 
diversion and held that the creek had been diverted from the south side causing 
it to flow toward the plaintiff's land on the north side. 
191. Id. at 382. 
192. Meyer v. Beauchamp, 51 S.W.2d 545 (St. L. Mo. App. 1932). 
193. Id. at 547. 
194. Jacobs v. Frangos, 329 S.W.2d. 262 (St. L. Mo. App. 1959). 
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In Dardenne Realty Company v. Abeken195 an upper riparian owner dammed 
a natural watercourse and diverted the water to several artificial lakes on his land. 
He inrended to use the lakes for duck hunting. The dam completely obstructed 
the flow of water in the stream and caused plaintiff's lakes to dry up. Plaintiff 
had on his lake a clubhouse, boathouse, pumps, pumphouses, and other equip-
ment. The lower court granted plaintiff an injunction against the dam and the 
diversion and from "in any way diverting or interfering with the natural flow 
of the stream, except for domestic uses."196 The St. Louis court affirmed the 
broad injunction without commenr as to its language, probably because the de-
fendant's use of the stream was clearly unreasonable under any theory of the 
doctrine of riparian rights. The case may indicate that the court will show a 
preference for a consumptive commercial use over a consumptive recreational 
use although its weight in this respect would seem to be slight. 
In Corrington v. Ka!icak, 197 University City built a bridge across a natural 
watercourse which caused the stream to overflow on the property of ten land-
owners. The defendant contended that the city had the right to build the bridge, 
which was not controverted, and that it was only liable for negligence in its de-
sign. The case suggested several theories of liability for the damages suffered: 
(a) an action based upon negligence; 
(b) an action based upon nuisance; 
(c) an action invoking Article I, 326, of the Missouri Constitution of 1945 
V.A.M.S., which provides that private property shall not be damaged 
for public use without just compensation; 
(d) an action based upon trespass. 
The court based the liability of the defendant on trespass saying: 
Liability for damages for causing the overflow of the waters of a natural water-
course by reason of an obstruction is not based upon intention to obstruct the water 
(except in the rare case of a malicious intent to injure the property of another) . Nor 
is the mere impounding of water the foundation of the action. The basis of liability is 
the fact that the obstruction causes the water to overflow, encroach upon and inflict 
special damages to the property of another. It is the impounding of the waters tO such 
an extent that an overflow occurs and a trespass results-a wrongful act-which fixes 
liability. Whether the impounding of the waters is intentional or accidental, whether 
the overflow is caused by negligence or without negligence, the agency obstructing 
the flow and causing the overflow of the waters of a natural watercourse to the dam-
age of adjacent property owners is liable for its misfeasance in an action of trespass. 198 
Another case brought on the theory of trespass came before the Kansas City 
court in 1948. 199 The plaintiff, a store owner in Fairfield on the Osage River 
above the head of the Lake of the Ozarks, contended that the defendant, Union 
195. Dardenne Realty Company v. Abeken, 232 Mo. App. 945, 106 S.W.2d 966 (1937). 
196. Id. at 948. 
197. Corrington v. Kalicak, 319 S.W.2d 888 (St. L. Mo. App. 1959). 
198. Id. at 894. 
1\19. Kennedy v. Union Electric Company of Missouri, 358 Mo. 504, 216 S.W.2d 756 (1948). 
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Electric Company, built Bagnell Dam across a natural watercourse and that the 
dam caused great silt deposits in the Osage River at the head of the lake which 
caused the river to overflow onto plaintiff's property. The court found that the 
dam could have caused the silting and the consequent overflow and held the 
defendant liable for trespass. 
Trespass was the theory for recovery in Rector v. Tobin Construction Company, 
Inc. 200 In that case, defendant company built a dam across a creek while building 
a bridge for the State Highway Commission. The plaintiffs claimed that the dam 
caused flooding which resulted in damage to their crops. The trial court found 
that the dam was reasonably necessary to the construction of the bridge, and 
that defendant company was entitled to share the sovereign immunity of the 
State Highway Department. 
The St. Louis court reversed the decision stating that the State Highway 
Department was not liable for the tortious acts of its employees. However, this 
did not exempt the agent of the department simply because he was working for 
the state. This court went on to say that the dam did retard the flow of the 
creek and that blocking the stream constituted a trespass which carried with it 
liability for damages. 
Depositing debris in a watercourse may also give rise to an action of tres-
pass. In Blankenship v. Kansas Exploration 201 the defendant in conducting his 
mining operations dumped sludge and debris into the stream. The sludge was 
carried a short distance downstream to the plaintiff's mill pond where it quickly 
filled the pond and destroyed the water power which ran the plaintiff's grist 
mill. The defendant was held liable for the trespass for the value of the mill, or 
the cost of removing the sludge plus loss of profits, whichever was less. 
Alteration of Quality 
Similar to the preceding section on the quantity of flow, it is the right of a 
riparian owner to have the watercourse continue to flow in its natural condition 
of purity. Pollution at common law is usually considered a nuisance and as such 
unreasonable per se. 
In Hunze v. City of Cape Girardeau202 the defendant city was held liable for 
the maintenance of a nuisance for diverting its sewage into a natural watercourse 
while it was repairing the regular sewage system. It was not necessary to plead 
or prove negligence in so polluting. 
In Divelb!iss v. Phillips Petroleum Company, 203 the Kansas City court held that 
a petition alleging that the oil company had allowed petroleum products to be 
discharged from its pumping station into a small branch running through plain-
tiff's land and that plaintiff's cows had drunk the polluted water from the 
branch and become ill, stated a cause of action for nuisance. 
2IJO. Rector v. Tobin Construction Company, 351 S.\'V'.2d 816 (Sr. L. Mo. App. 1961). 
201. Blankenship v. Kansas Explorations, Inc. , 325 Mo. 998, 30 S.W.2d 471 (1930). 
202. Hunze v. City of Cape Girardeau, 43 S.W.2d 882 (St. L. Mo. App. 1931 ). 
203. Divelbiss v. Phillips Petroleum Company, 272 S.W.2d 839 (K.C. Mo. App. 1954). 
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In Hillhouse v. City of Aurora204 the defendant city first established a muni-
cipal sewer system in 1923 which dumped raw sewage into a creek running 
through the city and then through plaintiff's land three miles downstream. In 
1934, the city installed a sewage disposal plant that continued in existence until 
this action was brought in 1958. From the evidence, it appeared that the creek 
was polluted to the same extent in the twenties but that the disposal plant took 
care of it until about 1946 when the pollution again became injurious. The issue 
presented was whether a single cause of action arose in 1923 because there was 
such a substantial invasion of the use and enjoyment of the land now owned by 
the plaintiff as would constitute a permanent nuisance or whether a cause of 
action did not arise until 1946 which would be classified as a continuous and 
abatable nuisance. Of interest here is the fact that the same pollution and con-
sequent injury to the same riparian land in 1923 would be a permanent nuisance 
whereas it would be a temporary and abatable nuisance in 1946. 
The court, cognizant of the development of treating sewage in the interven-
ing years, reasoned that what would have been practically impossible in 1923 
might be "reasonably practicable" in 1946. What connection did this have with 
the doctrine of riparian rights? In the first place, it was evidence that the court 
was aware and willing to adjust its reasoning to technological and economic 
changes. In the second place, the court was careful to point out that what was 
possible for the city in treating its sewage might not be reasonably practicable, an 
awareness of a "reasonableness" test as to nuisance. In remanding the cause to 
the lower court, this court suggested, among other factors, that the probable 
cost and economic feasibility of a more effective treatment and the financial 
ability of the municipality to do so should be considered-two factors that could 
well be used in any "reasonableness" test. 
Lewis v. City of Potosi,2 0 5 a 1961 decision, represents a very similar problem 
as that just discussed in Hillhouse v. City of Aurora. ~ 06 In this case, the City of 
Potosi caused raw sewage and contaminated effluent to be dumped into a creek 
which ran through the plaintiff's farm. The sewage and effluent wer<: also de-
posited on the plaintiff's farm. Both the creek and land gave off noxious odors. 
The court granted the plaintiff a judgment for a permanent nuisance even though 
the City of Potosi had a new sewage system very near completion. 
Bartlett v. Hume-S inc/air Coal Mining Company, 207 another 1961 decision, 
also concerned the pollution of a stream that ran through the plaintiff's farm. 
In processing its coal, the defendant company dumped chemical compounds and 
other waste on a plot of land west of the plaintiff's farm. Water collected at 
these dumps and later found its way to the stream and to the plaintiff's farm. 
Plaintiff sued for pollution, claiming the water was now unfit for either domes-
204. Hillhouse v. City of Aucora, 316 S.W.2d 883 (Spr. Mo. App. 1958). 
205. Lewis v. City of Potosi, 348 S.W.2d 577 (St. L. Mo. App. 1961). 
206. Hillhouse v. City of Aucora, supra note 204. 
207. Bartlett v. Hume-Sinclaic Coal Mining Company, 351 S.W.2d 214 (K.C. Mo. App. 1961). 
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tic or livestock use. Valuable pasture land was also rendered useless. Defendant 
company claimed it was not liable, because it did not own the land where the 
chemical wastes were dumped. The Kansas City court rejected the defendant's 
contention, quoting a section from C.J.S. as support for the decision. The sec-
tion from C.J.S. sets out that one need not own the property on which the 
nuisance is created in order to be charged with liability for it. It is only neces-
sary that the defendant created the nuisance. 
Ownership of Bed 
A riparian owner owns the bed of a non-navigable watercourse if it is with-
in the boundaries of his land, or to the center thread of the stream if the stream 
is his boundary, subject to the burdens of such ownership.208 Such burdens in 
Missouri include the following: 
He could not cut loose or set adrift a raft or boat or canoe tied to a tree on the 
banks of the stream, although he owned the banks of the stream. He could not divert 
the water to a private lake on his own land to the exclusion of others . . . He could 
not obstruct the free passage of fish in the stream without criminal liability ... He could 
not build a dam in a watercourse on his own land without proceeding as required by 
Chapter 236 RSM 1949 Sec. 236.010 RSM 1949, et. seq. If the boundary line is be-
tween appellant's property and that of another, the boundary line and ownership 
would change with changes in the center or thread of the stream.2 09 
The law relating to the ownership of the bed of navigable watercourses 
will be discussed in the subsequent section on Navigable waters. 
An exclusive right of the riparian proprietor is the right to lands formed by 
the action of the water in depositing sand, earth, gravel or other material."This 
riparian right, known as the doctrine of alluvian, was first discussed by the Mis-
souri court in Smith v. St. Louis Public School. 210 That opinion recognized that 
the doctrine was based on natural reason and equity and was first found in the 
Roman law. It was substantially the same in the Spanish, French and English 
laws. 
The plain and simple principle upon which the right of alluvion is placed in the 
civil law is that he who bears the incidental burdens of an acquistion is entitled to 
its incidental advantages. Therefore, the proprietor of a field by a river, being exposed 
to the danger of loss from its floods, is entitled to the increment which may be grad-
ually annexed to it. 211 
The Smith case dealt with whether a lot in the city of St. Louis was riparian or 
not, irs having a road or tow path running parallel and next to the river. This 
question involves a whole body of law which is beyond the scope of this writ-
ing. Suffice it to say that the land must be riparian, that the lot borders on the 
208. Elder v. Delcour, 364 Mo. 835, 269 S.W.2d 17 (1954). 
209. !d. at 23. 
210. Smith, eta/. v. St. Louis Public Schools, 30 Mo. 290 (1860). 
211. !d. at 300. 
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water and it is not the existence of road or other easement that will deprive the 
owner of alluvion, but it is the fact that the road or easement is the boundary 
of the land. 
From the French Encyclopedia the court quoted the exposition of the doc-
trine: 
We must observe, however, that to acquire by right of alluvion, two conditions 
are necessary: first, that the increase should be made slowly and imperceptibly, in such 
a manner that it cannot be discovered in what time each part of the alluvion has been 
formed to and consolidated with the inheritance; second, that the inheritance, by vir-
tue of which the right of acquiring by alluvion is claimed, be contiguous to the river, 
in such a manner that the bed on which it flows seems as it were, to be part of the 
same inheritance ... 212 
The first element noted above, that is, that the addition of the land must 
be made slowly and imperceptibly, was brought out in Cooley v. Golden. 213 That 
case involved the Missouri River, a navigable stream, changing its course by cut-
ting across a horseshoe bend, leaving its old channel and forming a completely 
new channel. The plaintiff riparian owner claimed title to land uncovered by 
the recession of the river water. The court recognized that the doctrine of allu-
vion includes land uncovered by the water receding as well as land gained by 
accretion. The court quoted with approval from Gould on waters: 
\ 
Land formed by alluvion, or the gradual and imperceptible accretion from the 
waters, and land gained by reliction or the gradual and imperceptible recession of the 
water belong to the owner of the contiguous land to which the addition is made. 
There is no distinction in this respect between soil gained by accretion and that un-
covered by reliction.214 
However, since the river had instantaneously changed its channel, the court con-
cluded, citing Angell on Watercourses, that the plaintiff's boundary line re-
mained unchanged. 
If the waters of a navigable river or lake recede gradually and unsensibly, the 
derelict land belongs to the riparian proprietors and their boundaries change as the 
water recedes. This is on the same principle as that under which they take by accre-
tions. The recession must be gradual and imperceptible. In case the river, from storm, 
flood or other cause, entirely forsakes its channel and forms a new one, the boundary 
lines remain unchanged. 215 
Thus land gained by the doctrine of alluvion, which is the forming of new 
land by the action of water or the uncovering of land by water, caused by a slow 
and imperceptible change of the course of the stream, belongs to the riparian 
owner on whose land the new land is connected but where the watercourse has 
212. Id. at 302. 
213. Cooley v. Golden, 117 Mo. 33, 23 S.W. 100 (1893). 
214. Id. at 48. 
215. Id. at 49. 
RESEARCH BULLETIN 889 49 
instantaneously changed its channel, whatever the cause, the riparian owner's 
boundary remains the same. 
Islands formed in the bed of a non-navigable stream belong to the riparian 
owner who owns that part of the stream. If the stream is the boundary line be-
tween two different owners, each owns those islands on his side of the stream. 
But if the stream is navigable, the ownership of the bed remains in the state. Of 
course, if an island is individually owned, any additions to it will come under 
the doctrine of alluvion. 
In Rees v. McDaniel, 216 the land in controversy was originally an island on the 
Kansas side of the Missouri River. It appeared that the island had washed away and 
before it could be reformed the main channel of the river shifted to the Kansas 
side. The island was reformed by accretion from the plaintiff's shore on the Mis-
souri side which reached out and covered what had been the original island. If 
the change had been slow and imperceptible, the boundary between the states, 
and between the bordering riparians would have changed with the channel, but 
it appears that before the land in controversy was reformed, the channel of the 
river, by avulsion, changed to the Kansas side of the land in controversy, Hence, 
the court held, the boundary of the plaintiff was where the east bank of the Mis-
souri River was when the avulsion occurred. 
In Vogelsmeier v. Prendergast/ 17 the plaintiff acquired title to Holmes 
Island; situated in the Missouri River between St. Charles County and St. Louis 
County. Defendant was a riparian proprietor on the St. Louis side directly op-
posite the island. By the action of the river cutting away the upstream end and 
adding on to the lower end, the island moved downstream so that only a small 
portion of the original land area remained. At the same time, sandbars were 
built out from the defendant's property on the shore so they actually covered 
part of the area originally occupied by the island. The main channel of the Mis-
souri River separated these sand bars from the island until 1875 when the river 
suddenly shifted to the St. Charles County side and completely abandoned its 
old channel. The result was that the island became connected with the sand bars, 
which had become valuable land. The trial court gave judgment for the plaintiff 
on the theory that the land sued for was reformed within the area of the original 
survey even though it was not an accretion to the island. The supreme court 
reversed this judgment and held that the plaintiff's boundary ran only to the 
bank of the river and that he could extend his boundaries only by gradual ac-
cretion or reliction like other riparian owners. The island did not become con-
nected to the sand bars by accretion but as a result of the sudden change in the 
river, hence his boundary remained at the north edge of the abandoned bed. 
In Crandall v. Smith21 8 it appears the Missouri River had changed its main 
channel to the east, leaving a slough in its original bed still connected with the 
216. Rees, eta!. v. McDaniel, 115 Mo. 145, 21 S.W. 913 (1892). 
217. Vogelsmeier v. Prendergast, 137 Mo. 271, 39 S.W. 83 (1897). 
218. Crandall, et al. v. Smith, 134 Mo. 633, 36 S.W. 612, 614 (1896). 
50 MISSOURI AGRICULTURAL EXPERIMENT STATION 
river. The slough was forty to sixty yards wide and at: certain times of the year 
was deep enough to be navigated. The plaintiff owned land on the west side 
of what was the original channel of the river and claimed the land formed be-
tween the slough and the present channel. The defendant claimed the land as 
accretion to an island owned by him in the river. Without passing on the de-
fendant's claim, the court held that the plaintiff's boundary remained at the bank 
of the slough. Had the slough dried up completely, the plaintiff may have had 
a valid claim to the land, but the court would not allow the doctrine of accre-
tion to include the "jumping of a slough forty to sixty yards wide." As the 
court expressed it " . .. there is nothing saltatory about accretion." 219 
In McCormack v. Mi//er/ 20 the plaintiff in 1891 owned the land on the 
south side of Salt River in Pike County and the defendant owned land opposite 
plaintiff on the north side. The general course of the river was southerly but 
binding to the east between defendant and plaintiff's land and then turning 
south again. Because of the bend in the river the current cut away the soil at 
the north boundary of plaintiff's land until, in the seventeen years between 1891 
and the time this suit was brought, fifteen acres had been added to defendant's 
land on the north side of the river. The suit was brought to recover this :fifteen 
acres. Plaintiff contended this was his land because it lay within the original 
boundary lines of the plaintiff's land. The low~r court's demurrer to the plain-
tiff's evidence was upheld, the court saying: 
The respondent, as riparian owner on the north side of the river, was entitled to 
all additions to his land along the river by the process of accretion. A running stream, 
forming the boundary line between contiguous lands, continues to be such boundary iine, 
although the channel may change, provided the change is by the gradual erosion and 
cutting away of its banks and not by a sudden change leaving the old channel and 
forming an entirely new and different channel. In determining whether a riparian 
owner has title to land in controversy by accretion, the length of time in which it is 
in course of formation is not of importance. If it is formed by a gradual, imperceptible 
deposit of alluvion, it is accretion; but if the stream changes its course suddenly and 
in such manner as not to destroy the integrity of the land in controversy so that the 
land can be identified, it is not accretion and the boundary line remains as before the 
change of the channeJ.22 ' 
The controversy in Wright Lumber Company v. Ripley Countf22 revolved 
around the ownership of an island in the Current River. The Plaintiff contended 
that the island belonged to him under a conveyance of land on the bank of the 
river. Defendant contended that such a conveyance did not include the island 
because it was in existence at the time the United States patented the land to 
plaintiff's predecessor in title. The evidence showed that the island was not sur-
219. Id. at 640. 
220. McCormack v. Miller, 239 Mo. 463, 144 S.W. 101 (1912). 
221. !d. at 468. 
222. Wright Lumber Company v. Ripley County, 270 Mo. 121, 192 S.W. 996 (1917). 
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veyed as a separate tract of land by the government but was ignored just as the 
government ignores all other low and overflow land lying below the meander lines, and within the banks of such a river. Small islands such as this were com-
paratively worthless and no charge was made for them when sold in connection 
with the tract of adjacent land. 
Where the boundary between political sub-divisions is a river or stream, 
the boundary shifts with a change in the river or stream unless it shifts by a 
process of avulsion, even though one case has held contra. In Northstine v. Feld-
mann, "23 the plaintiffs claimed land which now lies south of the Missouri River 
in Franklin county. It appears that the river had changed its course sufficiently 
since the Constitution of Missouri was enacted in 1875 for land then north of 
the river and hence in Warren county to be south of the river. The court held 
that the constitution established the channel as it was in 1875 and it could be 
changed only as provided by the constitution. 
However, Mansur v. Hoffman 224 expressly overruled this case and held that 
neither statute nor the constitution changed the common law. Here the bound-
ary between Ray and Lafayette counties was contended to be where it was in 
1875 when the constitution was enacted, relying on Northstine v. Feldmann. 225 
The court rejected this contention, and after setting out the doctrine of accre-
tion, quoted from the United States Supreme Court in Nebraska v. Iowa: 
These propositions, which are universally recognized as correct where the bound-
aries of private property touch on streams are in like manner recognized where the boundaries between states or nations are by prescription or treaty, bound in running 
water. Accretion, no matter to which side it adds ground, leaves the boundary still 
the center of the channel. Avulsion has no effect on boundary, but leaves it in the 
center of the old channel. 226 
As if to fix the law for the question as to whether this case doctrine would 
apply to a boundary between two states the court further quoted from Nebraska 
v. Iowa: 
The result of these authorities puts it beyond doubt that accretion on an ordinary 
river would leave the boundary between two states the varying center of the channel, 
and that avulsion would establish a fixed boundary, to-wit: the center of the aban-doned channel. It is contended, however, that the doctrine of accretion has no appli-
cation to the Missouri River on account of the rapid and great changes constantly going on in respect to its banks; but the contrary has already been decided by this 
court .. . A question between individuals, growing out of changes in the very place 
now in controversy, was then before the court; and in the opinion, after referring to 
the general rule, it was observed: "It is contended by the defendant that this well 
settled rule is not applicable to land which borders on the Missouri River, because 
223. Northstine v. Feldmann, eta!., 298 Mo. 365, 250 S.W. 589 (1923). 
224. Mansur v. Hoffman, 318 Mo. 991, 2 S.W.2d 582 (1928). 
225. Northstine v. Feldmann, supra note 223. 
226. Mansur v. Hoffman, supra note 224, at 995. 
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of the peculiar character of that stream and of the soil through which it flows, the 
course of the river being tortuous, the current rapid, and the soil a soft sandy loam, 
not protected from the action of water either by rocks or the roots of trees; the effect 
being that the river cuts away its banks, sometimes in a large body, and makes itself 
a new course, while the earth thus removed is almost simultaneously deposited else-
where, and new land is formed almost as rapidly as the former bank is carried away. 
But it has been held by this court that the general law of accretion is applicable to 
land on the Mississippi River; and that being so, although the changes on the Mis-
sissippi, the difference does not constitute such a difference in principle as to render 
inapplicable to the Missouri River the general rule oflaw."~27 
In Bratschi v. Loesch228 the plaintiff claimed tide to gravel lying in Moreau 
Creek bur on plaintiff's side. The defendant contended that the conveyance to 
the plaintiff which read, to a white oak tree on the bank of Moreau Creek then 
downstream to the east boundary line, conveyed only to the bank and not to 
the center thread of the creek. In holding that the language should be construed 
as conveying to the center thread the court said "where the land conveyed is 
bounded by a non-navigable stream there is a presumption that the conveyance 
is to the center thread of the stream."229 
In Brown v. Wilson.230 Big River, a non-navigable stream, formed the bound-
ary between plaintiff's land on the south and defendant's land on the north. The 
land in question lay south of the main channel of the river but with a slough 
forty to fifty feet wide between it and the plaintiff's land. Thirty years prior to 
this suit the main channel was to the south of this land and the question before 
the court was whether the boundary was the original or present channel of the 
river. The St. Louis court decided the case, but in a certiorari proceeding, the 
Supreme Court considered the case on its merits and adopted the St. Louis 
court's decision on the main issue. The evidence at the trial showed that the 
slough still constituted a very distinct channel and water still ran through it in 
times of high water. Also, it appeared that the land in question originally was 
an island in the river before the main channel shifted from the south to the 
north side so that it could not be considered an accretion to either side. This 
evidence was sufficient to support the lower court's finding that the land be-
longed to the defendant on the north side of the river. The court's summary of 
the law of a shifting wet boundary as taken from the McCormack v. Miller, Brat-
schi v. Loesch, and Mansur v. Hoffman seems worthy of note here. 
Now the law is ... that where a nonnavigable stream of water constitutes the 
dividing line between two tracts of land, the possessor on either side, absent contrary 
restrictions or reservations in his deeds, holds to the center thread of the stream; that 
where a subsequent change in the course of the stream is by the slow and gradual 
227. Ibid. 
228. Bratschi v. Loesch, 330 Mo. 697, 51 S.W.2d 69 (1932). 
229. Id at 705. 
230. Brown v. Wilson, 131 S.W.2d 848 (St. L. Mo. App. 1939). 
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process of accretion, the boundary line changes with the stream, entitling the one 
owner to whatever is added to his land by reason of accretion; but that where the 
stream changes its course suddenly or in such a manner as not to destroy the identity 
of the land between the two channels or to render it incapable of indentification, the 
process is not one of accretion, and the boundary line remains as it was before the 
change in the channel of the stream.231 
In Bixby v. Backues232 the plaintiff claimed title to land lying immediately 
west of section 3 and east of the river. The defendant owned land across the 
river in section 4. Even though the conveyance to the plaintiff referred only to 
land in section 3, it did not expressly except or reserve any of the accretions. 
The court held, therefore, that the conveyance "presumptively carried with it 
all accretions previously formed to the lands described, even though such accre-
tions extended across the section line mentioned in the deed."233 
Although the rule that land formed by accretion becomes the property of 
the owner of the land to which it attaches seems self explanatory, a problem 
may arise as to the ownership of accreted land when such land forms first in 
front of one riparian owner and later extends in front of the land of an adjoin-
ing riparian owner. This adjoining owner should have a right to a portion of the 
accretion formed to his land, as it would be unjust to cut him off from water 
merely because the accretions first started forming to the land of his neighbor. 
The first case in Missouri to apply a rule of apportionment did so on the theory 
that the basic principle of the doctrine of accretion is to preserve the fundamen-
tal riparian right of access to water. 234 In that case, the defendant claimed title 
to accreted land which formed in front of both his and defendant's land on the 
west side of the Missouri River. Originally, both parties were riparian proprie-
tors, but, by the action of the river first cutting away their river frontage and 
then depositing new soil, their land was fronted by the alluvial soil. Defendant 
claimed the accretion process first started on his land and later extended up-
stream in front of plaintiff's land and that he was entitled to all such accretion. 
The court rejected defendant's contention, reasoning that to carry his proposi-
tion to its logical conclusion, all other riparians on that side of the river could 
be entirely cut off from access to the stream. This access to the river may be a 
substantial part of the actual value of the land and to cut it off would be a great 
injustice to the riparian proprietor. 
In Pearson v. Heumann 235 much the same contention was urged. In that 
case, four tracts fronted on the west bank of the Missouri River. By a gradual 
process of reliction the river moved east and uncovered land on the west bank, 
starting at the northernmost tract and extending southerly until all four tracts 
231. Id. at 851. 
232. Bixby v. Backues, 346 Mo. 955, 144 S.W.2d 112 (1940). 
233. !d. at 960. 
234. Crandall v. Allen, 118 Mo. 403, 24 S.W. 172 (1893). 
235. Pearson v. Heumann, 294 Mo. 526, 242 S. W. 946 (1922). 
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had a portion of the old river bottom uncovered. The plaintiff owned the sec-
ond from the north tract and claimed twenty-five acres in front of the most 
southerly tract. Like the defendant in the Crandall case the plaintiff claimed 
ownership not only of the land accreted to his property but to the land formed 
downstream in front of defendant's property. The latter he claimed because it 
was formed as an extension of the former, even though it was directly in front 
of and attached to defendant's property. This claim the court rejected as in the 
Crandall case and vested title in the defendants. 
One author makes the following statement of the law: 
It is impossible to lay down an absolute rule, whereby the rights of adjoining 
riparian proprietors to accretions formed in front of their respective tracts of land, can 
be justly decided under all conditions. As was said in Gordon v. Rice, 236 the effort to 
maintain for each coterminous proprietor his original waterfront, or his just propor-
tion of that remaining or added to the change of tJte river's course has of necessity 
caused the adoption of various plans to meet the varying changes of altered condi-
tions. No plan should be adopted that would allow one to claim land as accretion in 
front of the other's land, so as to cut off the other from the water. In all cases where 
it is practicable, every riparian proprietor is entitled to as much frontage on the new 
shore as he had on the old shore. When a river has just receded but has maintained 
its general course, and the water front of each section of land would be substantially 
preserved by extending the boundary lines, there is no reason why this should not be 
adopted as the rule. If, though, this plan does not give to the adjoining proprietors 
proportionally the same frontage that they had before the change, there are two meth-
ods that the courts have adopted to remedy the difficulty. One is that a line should 
be drawn at right angles with the general course of the river, from a point on the 
original river bank. The other method is to measure the line of the old river front, 
and determine the former frontage of each riparian proprietor. Each will then be en-
titled to his proportionate share of the new river front. This latter method is known 
as equitable apportionment.237 
Parts of Stream to Which Riparian Rights Attach 
As already discussed, riparian rights attach only to land adjoining the stream. 
Therefore, persons whose land is not in contact with the stream are not riparian 
owners and are not entitled to any rights in the use of the w.ater as private indi-
viduals. It should be noted that it is the ownership of the land adjoining the 
watercourse that gives rise to riparian rights and not the ownership of the bed. 
Thus, riparian rights attach to islands arising in a watercourse regardless of 
whether they are owned by a person owning other riparian land bordering on 
the stream. 
Ownership of the bed of a stream gives an exclusive right to take sand, 
gravel, and mussels sunk in the bed but does not necessarily include the exclu-
sive right to hunt, fish, or travel over the water. 2 38 If the stream is a private, 
236. Gordon v. Rice, 153 Mo. 676, 55 S.W. 241 (1900). 
237. Watkins, Jr., Some Problems Arising from Accretion, 3 MO. L. REV. 181 (1938). 
238. Elder v. Delcour, supra note 208. 
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non-navigable stream, the owner has the exclusive right to use the stream in 
any manner he desires subject only to the burden of not using it in such a man-
ner as unreasonably to interfere with another riparian owner's use. But if the 
stream is a public non-navigable or navigable stream, it is subject to the addi-
tional burden of public travel by boat which includes wading, fishing, camping, 
etc. 2s9 
Flooding 
The rule that every riparian owner is entitled to have a watercourse con-
tinue to flow through or along his land in its natural state without substantial 
alteration in quantity is rigidly enforced when water is backed up on the land 
of an upper riparian owner. 24° Consequently the doctrine of reasonable use has 
no application to the obstruction of a watercourse. In fact , an obstruction of a 
watercourse that invades the rights of others is a nuisance per se and renders 
the wrongdoer liable for any damages, without regard to negligence. 241 
Most of the suits involving flooding by interfering with the normal flow 
of a stream were pressed against railroad companies for obstructing the natural 
drainage of overflow water in rimes of high water. A statute provides that a 
railroad crossing must not impair the usefulness of a watercourse. 242 a 1911 case 
construed this section to mean that: 
. . . a railroad company constructing its roads over a watercourse is bound to leave 
such waterways or openings as are sufficient to afford an outlet for all water that may 
reasonably be expected to flow· through such watercourse, taking into consideration 
such freshets as might reasonably be expected to occur in view of the size of the 
stream, width of its bottom, height of its banks, carrying capacity, and the character 
of the country contributing to its flow.24 3 
Without the aid of a statute, the obstruction of a stream which cut off 
or retarded the flow was, at an early date, held to be a private nuisance, whether 
it backed water up or caused an overflow upstream. 244 Placing pilings in a 
stream which causes driftwood to accumulate, ultimately causing the stream 
to overflow is sufficient to give an injured party relief. 245 The purpose of the 
obstruction will not be considered, and if a party is injured, the person causing 
the obstruction must respond in damages. 246 
Failure to take action within a reasonable time may bar recovery by a party 
injured by the obstruction of a watercourse. In Scheurick v. Southwest Missouri 
Light Companl 47 the plaintiff allowed the defendant's predecessors in title to 
239. Id. at 847. 
240. Happy v. Kenton, supra note 179. 
241. South Side Realty Company v. St. Louis and San Francisco Railway Company, supra note 180. 
242. §388.210, RSMo 1959. 
243. South Side Realty Company v. St. Louis and San Francisco Railway Company, supra note 180. 
244. Welton & Edwards v. Martin, 7 Mo. 307 (1839) . 
245. Brink v. Kansas City, St. Joseph and Council Bluffs Railway Company ,.supra note 183. 
246. Mcintosh v. Ranklin, 134 Mo. 340, 35 S.W. 995 (1896) . 
247. Scheurich v. Southwest Missouri Light Company, 109 Mo. App. 406, 84 S.W. 1003 (1904). 
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build a dam across Shoal Creek that caused stagnant water to back up on his 
land. Five years later, he sought to recover his total damage when the defend-
ant raised the height of the dam six inches. Plaintiff claimed damages for over-
flow, obstruction of a public road used by him, destruction of mineral deposits 
in his land, disease caused by foul odors from stagnant water backed up behind 
the dam and seepage from the creek which made three of his fiields untillable. 
These injuries were held proper grounds for recovery, but only insofar as they 
were caused by the defendant raising the height of the dam. The court felt that 
it would be unjust to allow the plaintiff, who took no steps to remedy the situa-
tion when the dam was first built, to recover against the defendant, because the 
defendant might have refrained from buying the dam if the plaintiff had pre-
viously asserted his right. 
Liability for injury caused by flooding may be based on negligence, nuisance, 
or trespass. 248 If the flooding is caused by a state governmental unit, liability 
may be predicated on Article I §26, of the Missouri Constitution of 1945, which 
provides that private property shall not be damaged for public use without just 
compensation. 249 
The flooding need not be caused directly by an obstruction placed in the 
stream by the defendant. It has been held that flood damage, brought about 
when Bagnell Dam caused silt and sand to be deposited in the river immediately 
above the dam water, provided grounds for action claiming damage.250 
Artificial Watercourses 
Two problems ordinarily arise when dealing with artificial streams and 
lakes. If a riparian owner causes water to back up on his upstream neighbor, 
who, in reliance on the raised water, makes improvements around the new lake, 
can he claim a continuance of the new lake? If a stream is diverted into a new 
channel, either natural or artificial, can a lower riparian proprietor object to a 
rediversion to the original channel?2 51 
In Greisinger v. Klinhardt, 252 the Arcadia Country Cl1,1b dammed up a creek 
and created a 175 acre lake. Later, the lower part of the lake was conveyed to 
the denfendant and upper part was conveyed to the plaintiff. Both parties built 
up recreational areas on the lake and the guests of each used the entire lake. The 
defendant then objected to plaintiff's guests coming down onto his part. He 
built a fence across the lake on what they claimed was the boundary line and 
proceeded to drain the water from the plaintiff's property. 
The court held that the plaintiff h<J,d a right to have the water level main-
tained and enjoined the defendant from draining the lake. It reasoned that the 
248. Corrington v. Kalick, supra note 197. 
249. Id. at 892. 
250. Kennedy v. Union Electric, 358 Mo. 504, 216 S.W.2d 756 (1948) . 
251. Evans, Riparian Rights in Artificial Lakes and Streams, 17 MO. L. REV. 93 (1951). 
252. Greisinger v. Klinhardt, 321 Mo. 186, 9 S.W.2d 978 (1928) . 
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original owner had burdened part of the property with a dam for the benefit of 
the land covered by the lake, and, when the ownership was severed, the holders 
took their portion subject to the burdens and benefits that existed at the time of 
conveyance. Thus, the court held that the original owner had conveyed the land 
subject to an implied easement, and the plaintiff: 
... has a right to the maintenance of the dam, because when the Arcadia Club 
parted with the title, and when he acquired his property, the lake was appurtenant 
and necessary to the proper enjoyment of his premises. The evidence showed that his 
property was practically worthless if the lake was empty, or if it was materially low-
ered from its original level. All of the circumstances tended to show that the lake was 
intended to be permanent and was so understood by plaintiff and defendants when 
they acquired their several properties. 253 
The easement in the Greisinger case arose by implication in the grant, that 
is, had the parties thought about it, they would have expressly provided for it 
in the conveyance. Before the courts will raise an easement by implication it 
must appear that it is reasonably necessary for the enjoyment of the estate, it 
must be apparent at the time of the conveyance and it must be intended to be 
permanent. 
The right to have a stream continue to flow may attach to an artificial 
stream. 25 4 In the Schuler case, a farmer dug a ditch diverting a spring from its 
natural course so that it flowed into a pond. When the farm was later divided, 
the new owners took the property as it then existed and the stream could not 
be changed back to its original channel. 
In Stough v. Steelville Electric Light and Power Company.255 the defendant di-
verted the water from a stream to run his mill and returned it to the natural 
channel before the stream left his land. Seventeen years before the suit was 
brought, a flood caused the channel of the stream to be changed so the water 
no longer ran in its original channel. The defendant continued intermittently to 
divert the water and turn it back into the original channel causing damage to 
the plaintiff downstream. The court held that the right to divert the water con-
tinued only so long as the defendant could return the water to its natural chan-
nel. The flood had changed the natural flow from the original channel to the 
new steam and sometime in the intervening years the new channel became the 
natural channel. Thus the diverted water had to be returned to the new channel. 
The decision implied that the new channel did not become the natural channel 
immediately but at some point of time in the intervening seventeen years.256 
Riparian rights may be acquired in an artificial watercourse if it is substi-
tuted for a natural one or created under circumstances that indicate permanence.257 
253. Id. at 981. 
254. Schuler v. Weise, 9 Mo. App. 585 (1882). 
255. Srough v. Steelville Elecrric Light and Power Co., 206 Mo. App. 85, 226 S.W. 295 (1920). 
256. Id. at 296. 
257. Brill v. Missouri, Kansas and Texas Railway Company, 161 Mo. App. 472, 144 S.W . 174 (1912). 
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In the Greisinger case, the court ruled that an implied easement may be acquired 
by any conveyance of the land, i.e., by foreclosure of mortgage, by sheriff's deed, 
by tax sale, by any judicial proceeding, or by direct conveyance.258 
No discovered cases in Missouri have considered the problem of the builder 
of a dam or obstruction in a stream who later decides to remove it. Cases from 
other states generally reach the same result as the Greisinger case in holding 
that the builder may not remove the obstruction if it will injure other riparian 
owners.259 Like the Greisinger case, it must be shown that all parties involved 
intended the new situation to be permanent and had relied on that fact. The 
more difficult question is who must or who may maintain the dam. It has been 
suggested that the builder may abandon the dam and cannot be forced to keep 
it in repair, but that if he does he must allow the riparian owners to come onto 
his land to repair it. 260 
After an extensive survey of cases involving riparian rights in artificial lakes 
and watercourses, one writer has concluded that there is no good reason why 
riparian rights should not attach to these artificial bodies of water: 
Emphasis should be placed on the appearance of a settled condition rather than 
on the issue as to whether the watercourse or lake originated by an event happening 
in nature or by the hand of man. There is a distinction to be observed between arti-
ficially created lakes on the one hand and diverted watercourses on the other. In many 
cases of diverted watercourses the complainant does not want the water. In that event, 
he relies not upon his riparian rights as his ultimate basis of claim but upon the later 
established condition ... It should also be without significance whether the original 
diversion was made for the sole benefit of the diverter or was intended to benefit all 
those affected by it. If the new condition appears to be permanent and settled, the 
length of time it continues is only one factor, though an important one, and the pe-
riod of limitations of itself has no usual significance.26 ' 
Navigable Waters 
The determination of navigability has two different applications. One is to 
determine if the state has retained title to the bed of the stream. The other to 
determine of the public has an easement of passage over the water. 
The necessity of use of watercourses for transportation during the early his-
tory of Missouri caused the General Assembly to declare certain streams navi-
gable to protect the public's right of passage over them. Even though some of 
these laws are still in force/62 the Supreme Court of Missouri has declared such 
laws to be invalid. This was the effect of the Supreme Court's decision when it 
adopted the following proposition by respondent counsel in Applegate v. 
Taylor. 263 
258. Greisinger v. Klinhardt, 321 Mo. 186, 9 S.W.2d 978 (1928) . 
259. Evans, supra note 251. 
260. Evans, supra note 251, at 104. 
261. Evans, supra note 251, at 116. 
262. Gardner, Water.r and Watercourses- Navigability of Streams in Missouri, 19 MO . L. REV. 401 (1954). 
263. State ex r~~l. Applegate v. Taylor, 224 Mo. 393, 123 S.W. 892 (1909). 
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... the legislature had no authority to establish and declare the Chari ron River 
navigable, even though it intended to do so by virtue of the act of 1845, for the rea-
son assigned that the federal government alone possesses that power. 264 
Although the necessity for using streams for transportation has mostly dis-
appeared, certain statutes remain necessary to protect the public easement.265 
Since a riparian owner on a navigable stream owns the land only to the 
edge of the stream266 it becomes necessary to determine from court decisions 
what navigability in this sense means. This determination may affect his rights 
to sand and gravel in the bed of the stream and to islands formed in the stream. 
The test is usually expressed in terms of "commercial navigation." In 
McKinney v. Northcutt, 267 the plaintiff was floating rafts of ties down Indian 
Creek into the Meramec River. The defendant, who owned land on both sides 
of Indian Creek, contended he could charge the plaintiff for the privilege of 
floating rafts on his stream. The case is important here for its definition of navi-
gability. 
Capability of use by the public for purposes of the transportation of commerce, 
rather than the extent and manner of that use, affords the true criterion of the navi-
gability of waters. If they are capable in their natural state of being used for the pur-
pose of commerce, no matter in what mode the commerce may be conducted, they 
are navigable in fact, and become in law public highways. 26 8 
This rather broad definition of navigability was not necessary to the decision 
in favor of the plaintiff. Even though the stream was found to be non-navigable, 
it appears the decision should have been the same because the public has an 
easement of travel in a watercourse capable of floating logs and small craft. 269 
The McKinney case was followed in 1913 by Weller v. Missouri Lumber and 
Mining Co. 270 Again the plaintiff was floating logs down a stream. The defendant 
constructed a boom across the stream to prevent the logs from passing. The 
court referred to "a stream capable of transporting commerce in any manner in 
which commerce is ordinarily conducted" as "a navigable or floatable stream" and 
as such is a "public highway."271 As in the McKinney case, it was unnecessary 
for the decision to find that the title of the bed was in the state. 
When the Springfield Court of Appeals was first faced squarely with the 
issue of who owned the bed of the stream, it apparently backed away from the 
general language of the prior cases.27 2 In that case the plaintiff sought to enjoin 
the defendant from landing ties on a sand bar in the Gasconade River which he 
claimed was his land under a lease of land on the bank of the river. 
264. Id. at 487. 
265. §560.545, RSMo 1959. 
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Of course defendant claimed that the plaintiff could not complain because 
the sand bar was part of the bed of the stream and thus belonged to the state 
or its assigns. The decision is noteworthy for its distinction between the right 
to float logs and the ownership of the bed. 
We take judicial notice of the fact that the point on the Gasconade River, where 
this cause of action arose is near irs source; that on the topography of the country is 
stamped the grandeur of the magnificent Ozark uplift; that the stream throughout the 
county of Pulaski is at many places narrow and its water swift and beautiful; that in 
the beds of the Ozark stream there are shoals and bars which furnish a happy camp-
ing ground for the erstwhile fisherman; an occasional rapid joins the chorus of nature, 
and that while actually capable of floating logs, ties, and commerce of this character, 
they are not navigable streams with the bed of the river in the public.27 3 
Slovensky v. 0' Reilly, 274 was one of the first cases to clarify the issue of navi-
gability. There, the court explained that two tests are generally to be used. One 
would classify rafting logs as "commerce" and the other more rigid test followed 
by Missouri would require that the river be navigable in fact, that is, that it be 
capable of being used as a highway for commerce over which trade and travel 
may be conducted in the customary modes of travel on water. 2 75 The court fur-
ther clarified the latter test by declaring such a stream to be suitable 
... for the usual purpose of navigation, ascending or descending by vessels such 
as are employed in the ordinary purposes of commerce, whether foreign or inland, and 
whether steam or sail vessels. 276 
Grove v. Energy Coal and Supply Company, 27 7 provides further authority. for 
the commercial boat test. In a suit by a riparian owner to recover for gravel 
taken from the bed of the Black River, the court held that the river at this point 
was not navigable and that title to the bed of the river was in the adjoining ri-
parian owners. The test applied was whether it was "a stream such as will per-
mit and bear the passage of ordinary boats of commerce upon the bosom of its 
wacers."278 
In a more recent case, the supreme court has affirmed the test set out in 
the earlier cases and has refused to clarify further. However, since navigability is 
a question of fact and each case must be decided on its particular circumstances, 
the flexibility of this test is probably desirable. 
(T}hose rivers are navigable in law when they are used, or are susceptible of being 
used, in their ordinary condition as highways for commerce, over which trade and 
travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of travel on water/79 
273. Id. at 104. 
274. Slovensky v. O'Reilly, 233 S.W. 478 (1921). 
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is a standard that will permit adaption to the "modes of travel" used currently 
for commerce. Like all means of transportation, commercial modes of travel on 
water are changing and probably will continue to change in the future. 
A current opinion as to the customary commercial mode of travel was 
given by the St. Louis Court of Appeals in Sneed v. Weber. 280 In that case, plain-
tiff sued to enjoin defendant from maintaining a pontoon bridge across waters 
from a lake located on defendant's land. The lake was infested with stumps but 
by using extreme care a small boat could be navigated across the lake and into 
the Mississippi River. 
In discussing the navigability of the lake the court said that "to be navi-
gable under the Missouri rule it must be capable of floating boats such as are 
used in the customary modes of travel in pursuit of commerce."281 
As if to emphasize the fact that whether a stream is navigable must be a 
question of fact, the court said, 
... mere depth of water, without proof of its suitability to the ordinary purposes 
of commerce, will not render a watercourse navigable in the legal sense, nor will the 
fact that it is of sufficient depth to float small boats. 282 
In declaring the lake non-navigable the court gave three reasons for its de-
cision. It said that to declare the lake navigable would cause the rule of navi-
gability to become a detriment to the people instead of a benefit as intended; 
also, to declare such a body of water navigable would in effect declare every 
creek or similar body of water to be navigable; and third, the court said that in 
order to be navigable the stream must be navigable in its natural state and this 
is not so here because the lake is artificial. 283 
Title to the beds of navigable rivers passed from the federal government 
to the state on its admission to the Union. 284 By a law passed in 1895 the state 
transferred its tide to the county in which the land is located, to be held by such 
county for school purposes. 285 Another section of the same law includes lands 
later formed in the channel. 286 
The low water mark is the boundary of a riparian owner287 so that he has 
access to the water, even at its lowest stage. 288 Such a riparian owner also has 
all of the ordinary riparian rights subject, of course, tO the superior right of the 
public to use the water for navigation. 289 
280. Sneed v. Weber, 307 S.W.2d 681 (Sr. L. Mo. App. 1957). 
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If an island is formed in the river by the action of the water, the county is 
automatically the owner of it. 290 But if the river suddenly changes its channel 
and severs part of the riparian's land, he retains title to the land now an "island," 
losing title only to that part actually covered by the new channel. 291 If the is-
land originally formed in the river later becomes connected to the riparian's 
land, the boundary is where the land joined. 292 
In Volkerding v. Brooks293 the issue was ownership of accreted lands along 
an island in the Missouri River. Evidence was introduced showing that the land 
filled in from both parties' land. The trial court found that the plaintiff owned 
the lands. However, on appeal, the court reversed and remanded noting the evi-
dence that land filled in from both the plaintiff's and defendant's land. The court 
stated that the plaintiff's ownership could not extend beyond the point where 
the lands joined. 
The Longfellow case294 points out that the ownership of the bank and the 
bed of a navigable stream are both subject to limitations. The riparian owner's 
title is subject to the public's use of the land for necessary purposes of naviga-
tion. He cannot project piers into the river or build houses on the bank if it 
will injure navigation. Necessary purposes of navigation would include tying 
boats, removing and repairing them on the bank, carrying them around obstacles, 
etc. On the other hand, the navigator cannot interfere with the riparian's en-
joyment of his property beyond what necessity requires. 
Because surface water is treated as a common enemy and may be guarded 
against or disposed of in any reasonable manner, it is often important for a land-
owner who wants to drain low-.lying land to determine whether a particular 
swamp is a lake which he cannot raise or lower to the injury of another land-
owner or whether it is merely a body of surface water which may be drained or 
dammed. For example, in Applegate v. Franklin, 295 the plaintiff had established a 
successful fishery enterprise on part of Pemiscot Lake. The lake was one and 
one half miles wide and three miles in length, covering about 2,500 acres of 
land and described as: 
A shallow depression in the surrounding country, created in the seismic throes 
of nature, which convulsed chat section in the years of 1811 and 1812, familiarly 
known as the "New Madrid Earthquake." The maximum depth, contrasted with the 
height of the lake or shores, which are low, marshy, and scantily defined, did not ex-
ceed 6 feet in normal stage, in which condition it is devoid of current or flow, with-
out channels, except corruous passages between jutting ridges, and dotted with numer-
ous small islands, dividing it into separate smaller bodies of water, from which at dif-
ferent periods of the year, and under varying conditions, che water extended and 
290. Conran v. Girvin, 341 S.W.2d 75 (Mo. 1960). 
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spread out in all directions. Its minimum depth ever known was 3 or 31h feet, but it 
fluctuated considerably in extent, dependent on the precipitation of rain or snowfall. 
Prior to the construction of the system of levees which now guard that section against 
floods of the Mississippi River, distant about 2 miles at nearest point, this lake 
was supplied by water from that stream through a bayou or channel below the gen-
eral level of the contiguous region, and during high stages of water the flow from the 
river filled the lake, which, continuing to rise with the increasing volume of water in 
the Mississippi River, would overflow and inundate the surrounding territory, par-
ticularly toward the west and south, with the excessive water received, even as far as 
to find escape occasionally into Big Lake, Arkansas. As the height of the river would 
recede, the process would become reversed. After the erection of the levee along the 
bank of the Mississippi River, the lake was fed solely with water from the rain and 
snowfall in the surrounding country through numerous bayous and sluggish lagoons. 
The waters of the lake were largely filled with poludal vegetation, consisting of moss, 
flags, swamp grass, pond lilies, yonkerpius, and like amphibious vegetable growth in-
digenous to marshes and swamps.296 
The parties to the suit agreed that the lake was not navigable and that the 
ownership of the bed was not in the state. The plaintiff contended, however, 
that the lake was a natural watercourse and that he could recover for the destruc-
tion of his fishery caused by the defendant draining the lake. The court allowed 
the defendant to drain the water away in order to recover and make cultivable 
2,500 acres of his land because the lake was merely a 
... reservoir in the depression formed by the convulsions of nature described, in 
which water assembled, varying in magnitude and extent with the seasons, without 
possessing any of the attributes characterizing a public or navigable body of water.297 
The court's objection to calling the body of water a lake was apparently based 
on its findings that there were no well-defined banks and at normal level the 
water was dotted with many small islands which divided the water into many 
separate bodies of water. 
To see the fine distinction between a lake and a body of surface water, 
Keener v. Sharp298 should be compared with the Applegate decision. In the 
Keener case, Big Lake was two miles long and a half mile wide and varied in 
depth from 18 inches to seven feet. The main distinction in the two lakes was 
that Big Lake was fed partially by the Mississippi River, had fairly well defined 
banks and was one contiguous body of water. One other distinguishing feature 
that may have influenced the court was that in the Applegate case the defendant 
was attemping to recover 2,500 acres of potentially productive land while in the 
Keener case the defendant wanted to flood the plaintiffs land so he could float 
logs out into the river. 
The law governing the ownership of the bed of a lake is similar to that 
governing streams. For large, navigable lakes, the riparian owners own only to 
296. !d. at 348. 
297. !d. at 349. 
298. Keener v. Sharp, 341 Mo. 1192, 11 S.W.2d 118 (1937) . 
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the water's edge. 299 But on a non-navigable lake, the abutting proprietor's title 
extends to the cemer of the lake. 300 If the land covered by the lake was sur-
veyed by the government without regard to the water, this is prima facie evi-
dence that the center of the lake is not considered in determining the land 
boundaries but that the boundaries called for in the deed will prevaiJ.3° 1 
Riparian rights in a lake are quite similar to those in a stream. A riparian 
owner on a lake has the right to the continuance of the lake in its natural con-
dition.302 If the lake is large enough to be used for boating or fishing, every 
riparian on the lake is entitled to use the entire surface. 
In speaking of the rights of several riparians on an artificial lake that pos-
sessed the necessary characteristics of permanency to be considered a natural 
lake, the supreme court has said that as long as the lake was maintained, 
the soil beneath it could not be used for any other purpose; the ownership of the 
land adjacent to the lake determined the rights to use the water of the lake for all 
purposes ... The waters of the lake were as important and as convenient to any one 
occupying the land at the upper end of the lake as to one at the lower end, and the 
right of the subsequent owner of the upper end was exactly the same as the right at 
the lower end. 30" 
State jurisdiction Over Watercourses 
The state has jurisdiction in four different areas with regard tO the natural 
watercourses in the state. It has the power ( 1) to regulate and control fishing in 
all waters of the state; (2) to control and protect all navigable waters of the 
state for purposes of navigation; (3) to control and regulate the exercise of all 
rights incident to the ownership of beds of all watercourses to which the state 
holds title, either in trust for the benefit of the people or in its own right; and 
( 4) to control and regulate the general use of all public waters. This is in addi-
tion to the powers and rights the state may have as riparian proprietor on a par-
ticular watercourse. 
Only control and regulation of fishing will be discussed here. Public con-
trol and regulation of public waters is beyond the scope of the present inquiry. 
The public right to free passage of fish in rivers and streams has been established 
and regulated by laws in England and in this country for so long that anyone 
who builds a dam on such streams does so under an implied condition to keep 
open fishways unless there is an express provision exempting him.304 Missouri 
legislation protecting fish in lakes and streams was first enacted in 1885 305 and 
299. Kirkpatrick v. Yates Ice Company, 45 Mo. App. 335 (K.C. Ct. App. 1891). 
300. Id. at 338. 
301. Id. at 339. 
302. Bohannon v. Camden Bend Drainage District, 240 Mo. App. 492, 208 S.W.2d 794 (1948). 
303. Keener v. Sharp, supra nore 298. 
304. Stare v. Gilmore, 141 Mo. 506, 42 S.W. 817 (1897). 
305. See Missouri Session Laws of 1879 at 153-156. 
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has continued in force with modifications and amendments until the present.306 
... [F]rom the earliest times the right of the public to the passage of fish in rivers, 
and the private rights of riparian proprietors, incident to and dependent on the public 
right, have been subject to the regulation of the legislature; and the mode adopted 
by the legislature, whether by public or private acts, to secure and preserve such rights, 
has been by requiring, in the erection of such dams, such sluices and fishways as would 
enable these migratory fish, according to their known habits and instincts, to pass 
from the lower to the higher level of the water, occasioned by such dam, so that, al-
though their passage might be somewhat impeded, it would not be essentially ob-
structed thereby. 307 
The ownership of fish is vested in the state until they are reduced to pos-
session.308 If the possession is lawful, the ownership is vested in the state for 
the purpose of "control, management, restoration, conservation and regulation 
thereof. "309 
In State v. Taylor. 310 the state was attempting to punish the defendant for 
exploding dynamite in a private fishing pond. In holding that the fish in this 
private pond were protected by the laws forbidding the use of explosives the 
court said: 
The ownership of fish while they are in a state of freedom is still in the state, not 
as a proprietor, but in its soverign capacity as the representative and for the benefit 
of all its people in common. In other words, the right of property in fish so far as 
any can be assessed before they are taken and reduced to possession, is common to all 
the people and cannot be claimed by any particular individual.311 
The court continued that fish put into a private pond by the owner him! 
self and which had no connection with any other water were not reduced to pos-
session. This indicates the breadth of the state's jurisdiction of fishing rights. 
The exclusive right of fish in a private pond remains in the landowner and 
of course he is under no duty to maintain the pond or care for the fish. But the 
impact of the Taylor decision seems to be that he must comply with the state 
law in reducing the fish to possession. It should be noted that this was a case 
of first impression and that the defendant was not the owner of the pond, but 
was a trespasser. 
SUBTERRANEAN WATERS 
Subterranean water occurs either as an underground watercourse or as per-
colating water. 312 The courts have held that the rules applicable to surface 
306. §§252.010-.230, RSMo 1959. 
307. Commonwealth v. Essex Company, 13 Mass. (Gray) 239 (1859). 
308. State v. Blout, 85 Mo. 543 (1885) . 
309. §252.030, RSMo 1959. 
310. State v. Taylor, 358 Mo. 279, 214 S.W.2d 34 (1948). 
311. ld. at 282. 
312. Sycamore Coal Company v. Stanley eta!., 292 Ky. 168, 166 S.W.2d 293 (1942). 
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streams also apply to underground streams. The previous discussion of water-
courses is therefore applicable to this type of subterranean water. 
Percolating waters are ordinarily defined as those which ooze, seep, or filter 
through the soil beneath the surface without following a defined channel.313 
Percolating waters are important in cases dealing with subterranean supplies be-
cause all subterranean waters are presumed to be percolating, and to remove this 
presumption there must be clear and convincing evidence of an underground 
stream. :n4 
Percolating Waters 
The two rules which have developed with respect to percolating waters are 
the English or "common law" rule and the American or "reasonable use" rule. 
The common law rule was established in the English case of Acton v. Blundell. 315 
This rule was used especially in early U. S. decisions, and is still law in some 
states. The reasonable use rule developed later in U. S. decisions and is now the 
law in a majority of states. This rule is followed by all of Missouri's neighboring 
states that have taken a position on this subject. 
The common law rule allows anyone who owns land to use as he wishes 
all of the water he finds in the soil. 3 1 6 If he uses percolating waters, thereby 
causing damage to a neighbor's well or spring, he is not liable. The only limita-
tion is that one cannot thereby maliciously in jure his neighbor. 317 
The reasonable use rule limits a landowner's use of percolating waters to 
that amount which is necessary for a useful purpose, or such amount as is neces-
sary in order to make a reasonable use of his land. 318 
The difference in the two rules arises primarily out of uses off the owner's 
land.319 Under the common law rule the owner can pump and sell percolating 
water without liability, but under the reasonable use rule the landowner can do 
so only if no one is damaged as a result.320 
Missouri Law of Percolating Waters 
No Missouri case has been found which defines percolating water. There-
fore, the Missouri courts are free to adopt any definition which they choose. 
Only three cases are found in which the supreme court might have given its 
position on percolating waters, but in each case the court failed to state a position. 
Springfield Waterworks Co. v. Jenkins.321 decided in 1895, was the first Mis-
souri case that dealt with subterranean waters. A lake and a spring were located 
313. United Fuel Gas Company v. Sawyers, 259 S.W.2d 466 (1953). 
314. Commonwealth of Kentucky, Department of H ighways v. Sebastian, 345 S.D.2d 46 (1961). 
315. Acton v. Blundell, 12 Mees & W. 324, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (1843). 
316. Sycamore Coal Company v. Stanley eta! .. .rupra note 312. . 
317. CRIBBET, PRINCIPLES OF THE' LA W OF PROPERTY, 301 (1962). 
318. Sycamore Coal Company v. Stanley eta!., supra note 312. 
319. CRIBBET, supra note 317. 
320. CRIBBET, supra note 317. 
321. Springfield Waterworks Company v. Jenkins, 62 Mo. App. 74 (1895) . 
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on the defendant's land. A spring also existed on the plaintiff's land which was 
used to supply water to the city of Springfield, Missouri. The plaintiff's spring 
was partially supplied with water by seepage from the defendant's lake. During 
drouth seasons the defendant drained his lake numerous times claiming that he 
was repairing the bed. The plaintiff sued to enjoin the defendant from draining 
the lake or from stopping the flow of water. The court reversed and remanded 
the trial court's decision co dissolve the temporary injunction saying that even 
though the water which fed the plaintiff's spring did nor flow through any per-
ceprable channel, the lake could nor be drained merely to cause injury to the 
plaintiff. 322 The seepage from the defendant's lake could have been defined as 
percolating water, but the court did nor do so. 
In Raynor v. Excelsior Sprinf(S Light, Power, Heat and Water Co. / 23 a 1908 
decision, the defendant released by-products from a gas manufacturing plant into 
a srream which flowed by the plaintiff's home. The polluted water seeped into 
and ruined the plaintiff's well. Again, we have a case of percolation by seepage 
through the soil. Again the court made no mention of percolating waters. 
The last Missouri case found is the 1941 decision of Ingram v. Great Lakes 
Pipe Line Co. a2-1 Here the plaintiff sued and recovered for destruction of a spring 
caused by biasing. The court did not mention percolating waters even though 
there was strong evidence that the source of the spring was seepage through 
limestone rock and not an underground stream. 
Since Missouri has nor adopted either rule as to percolating waters, a look 
at the development in neighboring states may help predict the rule Missouri 
will follow when the occasion arises . 
First, in Kentucky in Sycamore Coal Co. v. Stanley, et. a!., 325 it is set out that 
Kentucky believes the reasonable use rule to be sound. The defendant was mak-
ing a legitimate and reasonable use of his land by drilling a "core hole" to de-
termine the depth of a coal seam, therefore judgment was for the defendant 
company. 
The state of Arkansas adopted the reasonable use rule in 1957 in the case of 
Jones v. Oz.-Ark.- Val. Poultry Co. 326 The court decided that the defendant's use 
of water from wells to process thousands of chickens per day was unreasonable 
since it caused the plaintiff's well, which was used for domestic purposes, to go 
dry. 
Illinois apparently adopted the common law doctrine in 1899 with the case 
of Edwards v. Haeger. 3 27 However in a recent case of Behrens v. Sharringhausen328 
322. ld. at 82. 
323. Haymor v. Excelsior Springs Light, Power, Heat and Water Company, 129 Mo. App. 691, 108 S.W. 580 
(1908). 
324. Ingram v. Great Lakes Pipe Line Company, 153 S.W.2d 547 (K.C. Mo. App. 1941). 
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326. Jones v. Oz-Ark-Val Poultry Company, 228 Ark. 76, 306 S.W.2d 111 (1957). 
327. Edwards v. Haeger, 180 Ill. 99, 54 N.E. 176 (1899). 
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the court stated that Illinois may adopt the reasonable use doctrine when a 
proper case arises. 
Kansas has rejected both rules and adopted the Kansas Water Appropria-
tion Act which sets out that the water is dedicated to the use of the people of 
the state, subject to the control of the state. 329 
Cribber, a noted authority on property, says that in the case of the riparian 
doctrine the evolution is toward reasonable use. This fact could have a powerful 
influence on courts when they are next faced with a specific problem of per-
colating water. Also until recently there has been sufficient water for all uses, 
reasonable or unreasonable. Without the problem of short supply and great de-
mand, the law of the humid states has not had a chance to develop. 330 
Until Missouri declares its position on the law of percolating waters, the 
Restatement should be good authority since it is a codification by noted authori-
ties of what they think the law is or what the law should be. 
The Restatement places liability on the defendant for intentional invasion 
of subterranean waters, if the invasion is unreasonable. Liability also attaches for 
unintentional invasion if the harmful use is negligent, reckless or ultrahazardous~ 3 3 1 
It is argued that the reasonable use rule is not a different rule than the com-
mon law rule, but is only a limitation on that rule.a 32 This argument has merit 
because only one variance from the common law rule is found in the reasonable 
use rule. Under the reasonable use rule, a landowner cannot legally remove and 
sell percolating water if another landowned is injured thereby. 3 33 
Under either rule, an owner can use all of the water he wants on his land, 
even though a neighbor gets none.:lH This difference, linked with short supply 
and increasing demand, and the trend of states toward the reasonable use rule 
will be important fac;tors in Missouri's choice of a rule when a proper case is 
presented. 
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